AL-BÂBU 'L-ḤÂDÎ 'ASHAR

A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SHÎ'ITE THEOLOGY

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BY

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WITH COMMENTARY BY

MIQDÂD-I-FÂḌIL AL-ḤILLÎ

TRANSLATED FROM THE ARABIC BY

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DEDICATED

TO

DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD

FOREWORD

In the year 1924 I had the privilege of studying for a few months under Dr. Duncan B. Macdonald of Hartford Theological Seminary, and of reading with him the Arabic creed of An-Nasafî, a concise statement of the tenets of the Sunnite Muslims. Before leaving Hartford I asked Dr. Macdonald to outline a course of study which I might profitably follow after returning to my work in Persia. He suggested that I should try to find a Shî'ite creed, similar to that of An-Nasafî, and translate it into English, since no adequate statement of the Shî'ite doctrines was available for English readers.

Accordingly, on reaching Meshed I began to make inquiries in order to discover some such creed which was generally accepted by the Shî'ite doctors. For some time I was unsuccessful, but at last one of my Mullâ friends suggested to me "Al-Bâbu 'l-Ḥâdî 'Ashar," assuring me that it was just the book that I was seeking. He said that it was widely used in the *madrasas* of Meshed as an introduction to scholastic theology and the *uṣûl* (the "principles" of the faith), and was generally accepted as a correct exposition of the Shî'ite doctrines. I secured a copy of the book, a very poor lithograph dated 1320 A.H., and began to read it with the Mullâ, without whose assistance I could have made but little headway in it.

I found that the work consisted of a brief statement of the Shî'ite "principles" and a detailed commentary on the same, all in Arabic. The text (*matn*) alone was too condensed to be of much value to the student. The commentary was somewhat long, but the argument was in most places so close that it would have been difficult to condense, so I decided to translate it in full. At Dr. Macdonald's suggestion I have added a few notes, principally in order to explain the differences between the Shî'ite and Sunnite doctrines. In my translation

I have endeavoured to adhere as closely as possible to the original. In quoting the Koranic verses I have followed Rodwell's translation, except that, for the sake of uniformity, I have always used the terms *Allâh* and *Messenger* (rasûl) instead of *God* and *Apostle*.

I wish to express here my deep appreciation to Dr. Macdonald, who inspired me to undertake this task and aided me in performing it. I am also indebted to Dr. R. A. Nicholson of Cambridge University for his great kindness in correcting my manuscript and securing its publication.

WILLIAM McE. MILLER.

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SKETCH OF 'ALLÂMA-I-ḤILLÎ

Ḥasan b. Yûsuf b. 'Alî b. Muṭahhar al-Ḥillî, commonly known as 'Allâma-i-Ḥillî or 'Allâma, was born 19 Ramaḍân 648/1250, and died 11 Muḥarram 726/1326. He studied jurisprudence and scholastic theology and the principles (*uṣûl*), and Arabic and the other sciences of the law with his uncle, the Doctor of the people of the House (of the Prophet), Najmu'd-Dîn Abû'l-Qâsim Ja'far b. Sa'îd-i-Ḥillî entitled Muḥaqqiq-i-Awwal (d. 726/1325; see Browne's "Persian Literature in Modern Times," pp. 378, 405), and with his father Shaykh Sadîdu'd-Dîn Yûsuf b. al-Muṭahhar. And he studied philosophical subjects with the master of mankind, Khwâja Naṣîru'd-Dîn-i-Ṭûsî (d. 672/1274; see Browne, p. 405), and others of the Shî'ites and Sunnites.

'Allâma is said to have written 500 books. Among his works mentioned in the Qiṣaṣu'l-'Ulamâ is "Minhâju's-Ṣalâḥ," which consisted of ten chapters. "Al-Bâbu 'l-Ḥâdî 'Ashar" was later added to this book as an eleventh chapter. The *main* (text) only is the work of 'Allâma. The commentary was written by Miqdâd-i-Fâḍil, also of Ḥilla, who lived and composed commentaries on theological works during the latter part of the eighth century A.H.

'Allâma was born just eight years before the capture of Baghdâd by the Mongols. During his youth Persia was ruled by the Îl-Khans, the descendants of Hûlâgû. It was a time of bloodshed and confusion, but with the invasion of the Mongols there also came a revival of trade and of letters. The first Îl-Khans were heathen, but they showed great favour towards the Christians, and carried on negotiations with the Christian rulers of Europe regarding a united attack upon the Muslims. Accordingly there was more freedom for the discussion of religious questions than had previously existed. Several of the Îl-Khans were on the point of becom-

ing Christians, but the influence of Islâm finally prevailed, and at last in 1295 A.D. (when 'Allâma was forty-five years of age) Ghâzân became a Muslim and threw his influence on the side of Islâm. He showed great favour toward the Shî'ites, and enriched the shrines of Karbalâ and Mashhad.

Ghâzân was followed by Ûljâytû Khudâ Banda, who had been baptized in infancy as a Christian, but who, on his accession to the throne in 1305 A.D., confirmed the Islâmic laws of his predecessor. At first he was a Ḥanafite; later he inclined to the Shâfi'ite doctrine, and finally, after seeing a vision on the occasion of a visit to the tomb of 'Alî at Najaf, he became a Shî'ite. He was fond of religious discussion, and the doctors of the various schools were brought before him to expound their doctrines. The following stories, which tell something of 'Allâma's part in the king's conversion, are taken from the "Qiṣaṣu'l-'Ulamâ," which was written in 1290 A.H. by Muḥammad b. Sulaymân of Tanukâbun (see Browne, pp. 354, 355).

In the history of Ḥâfiẓ Abrû (see Browne's "Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion," pp. 424-426) it is recorded that when the falsity of the faith of the people of tradition and agreement (the Sunnites) had to some extent become clear to Sulṭân Ûljâytû Muḥammad-i-Khudâ Banda (1303-1316 A.D.; see Browne's "Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion," pp. 46-51), he commanded that the Imâmite doctors be summoned. When 'Allâma came with the other doctors it was appointed that Khwâja Niẓâmu'-Dîn 'Abdu'l-Malik-i-Marâghî, who was the greatest of the Shâfi'ite doctors, and in fact of all the Sunnite doctors, should dispute with the honoured 'Allâma. And 'Allâma disputed with the Khwâja and proved the uninterrupted succession of the Commander of the Faithful ('Alî) and the fallacy of the claim of the three Shaykhs of the Sunnites with convincing arguments and clear reasons, and he set forth the pre-eminence of the religion of the Imâmites in such a manner that there was no possibility of doubt left to those who were present. And when the Khwâja heard the reasons of the honoured 'Allâma, he said, "The strength of the arguments is exceedingly plain, but since past generations have

walked in a certain way, and men at present have drawn the curtain of silence over their mistakes in order to bridle the ignorant and remove the differences in the faith (kalima) of Islâm, it is therefore fitting that they should not rend the veil and curse them."

A story is told of Sulṭân Ûljâytû, who had a wife whom he loved very much. Once he spoke the triple divorce formula to her, and the lawyers of Islâm said there was no way to take her back except by her first being married to another and having him divorce her. He inquired whether there was not some other sect which provided another way. They replied that the Imâmites did, but they were few in number. So he sent to Ḥilla for their doctors, and 'Allâma came to him. On entering the room he took off his shoes and came in with them in his hand. The courtiers blamed him for not prostrating himself, but he answered that one should bow before God only. Then they asked him why he had not left his shoes at the door. He replied that he had heard that the Prophet had gone to a meeting of Mâlikites and his shoes had been stolen, and since there were Mâlikites present he wanted to watch his shoes. They laughed at him for his ignorance, and told him that Mâlik had lived 100 years after the time of the Prophet. He said he had forgotten, it was not the Mâlikites but the Ḥanbalites. Again they corrected him, and so for all four of the sects of the Sunnites. "Then," he said, "if all four of the Imâms lived after the Prophet, how did they originate these sects?" And he completely refuted their doctrines.

We are told that 'Allâma was once going to Karbalâ on pilgrimage riding on a donkey, when a stranger joined him. They began to talk, and the stranger proved to be a very learned man. 'Allâma brought to him all his problems, and he solved them. He answered 'Allâma's objections by referring him to certain traditions of which he was ignorant, giving book and page and line, and when 'Allâma later consulted these books he found that all the references were correct. Finally 'Allâma asked him whether the Hidden Imâm could be seen or not. Just then 'Allâma's whip fell to the ground. The stranger stooped and picked it up and gave it to him,

saying, "Why not see him, when his hands are in yours?" and then he disappeared.

As for Miqdâd-i-Fâdil, the author of the commentary, I have been unable to learn anything of the story of his life from the biographies which I have consulted. He is not so well known as 'Allâma, but for our purpose his commentary is of more value than is the *matn* of 'Allâma, which is frequently too condensed to be wholly intelligible.

AL-BÂBU 'L-ḤÂDÎ 'ASHAR

INTRODUCTION

1. Allâh the Most High did not create the world in vain, in which case He would be only a trifler, but with purpose and wisdom which can be ascertained by those who consider. And He specified that purpose expressly when He said, "I have not created Jinn and men, but that they should worship me" (Koran 51:56). Hence it is incumbent upon everyone who belongs to the company of rational beings to respond to the Lord of the Worlds. And since that is impossible without a certain knowledge (ma'rifa) of Him, it is incumbent upon every responsible person who knows Allâh to arouse the slothful and guide the erring by writing out and explaining the introductory treatises of men of understanding. And among these introductions is the one called *al-Bâbu 'l-Ḥâdî 'Ashar* ("The Eleventh Chapter"), one of the compositions of our Shaykh and Imâm, and the Imâm of the world, the most knowing, the most excellent, and the most perfect, the Sulṭân of the masters of investigation, the preceptor of those who search and examine, the writer on subjects for intellectual investigation, the arranger of legal reasons, the sign of Allâh in the worlds, the heir of the wisdom of the prophets and apostles, the perfection of the People and the Religion, Abû Manṣûr al-Ḥasan b. Yûsuf b. 'Alî b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillî ('Allâma-i-Ḥillî)—may Allâh sanctify his spirit and illumine his tomb.

2. And in spite of the conciseness of its expression this treatise abounds in knowledge, and in spite of the abbreviation of its style it abounds in wealth. And in time past I had had the desire to write something as an aid to the understanding of it by composing the reason and proofs, in response to the request of some of the brethren. Then hindering events and

the rebuffs of treacherous fortune held me back from finishing it, for these things cut a man off from accomplishing his will and attaining his purpose, and stand between him and his desire. Then there occurred gatherings and discussions on several journeys, along with the piling up of business and the disturbance of my thoughts. And some of the great besought me to go back to the consideration and thought of what I had first written and to return to what I had collected. So I agreed to their request, for Allâh the Most High made it incumbent upon me to respond to it, in spite of the lack of worldly goods and the excessive number of engagements which hindered me from doing it. And I begin it seeking aid from Allâh the Most High for it, and drawing near to Him by means of it, and I called it *al-Nâfi'u li-Yaumi l-Ḥashr* in explanation of *al-Bâbu 'l-Ḥâdî 'Ashar*. And there is no success except through Allâh, in whom I trust and to whom I shall return.

AL-BÂBU 'L-ḤÂDÎ 'ASHAR
(THE ELEVENTH CHAPTER)

3. CONCERNING WHAT IS INCUMBENT (wâjib) UPON ALL *MUKALLAFS* REGARDING THE KNOWLEDGE (ma'rifa) OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGION (dîn).

It is called the Eleventh Chapter because the writer made an abbreviation of the "Miṣbâḥu'l-Mutahajjid" which Shaykh Ṭûsî wrote concerning worship and prayer, and arranged it in ten chapters and gave to this abbreviation of the "Miṣbâḥ" the title of "Minhâju's-Ṣalâḥ." And since that book was concerned with the science of conduct ('amal) and worship and prayer, these things required a knowledge (ma'rifa) of the Object of worship and of Him to whom prayer is offered. So he added this eleventh chapter.

4. BEING INCUMBENT (wujûb) as a word means *established* and *fallen*, as in Allâh's word, "And when they are fallen (wajabat) over on their sides" (Koran 22: 37). And in usage *wâjib* is that the neglect of which involves blame under certain circumstances. And it is of two kinds: (1) that which is incumbent in itself, that is, that which no one can perform for another; and (2) that which is incumbent by sufficiency (kifâyat*an*), and it is the opposite of the first. Knowledge (ma'rifa) is of the first kind, and for that reason he said, "it is incumbent upon all *mukallafs*."

5. And a MUKALLAF is a human being, alive, adult (males over fifteen and females over nine years of age), and rational. So dead persons, children, and insane persons are not *mukallafs*.

6. And FOUNDATIONS (uṣûl) is the plural of *aṣl*, and is that upon which something else is built.

7. And RELIGION (dîn) as a word means *requital*, as said the Prophet, "As thou treatest men (tadînu) so shalt thou be treated." And in usage it means *way* (ṭarîqa) and *law* (sharî'a), and that is the meaning here. And this science is called

"foundations" because the other religious sciences, tradition and jurisprudence and exegesis, are built upon it. And it depends on the veracity of the Messenger. And the veracity of the Messenger depends on the veracity of the Sender and His qualities and His justice and the impossibility of there being evil in Him. And the science of "foundations" is that in which the unity of Allâh the Most High and His qualities and His justice and the prophecy of the prophets and the acknowledgement of that which the Prophet brought and the imâmate of the Imâms and the return (ma'âd) are investigated.

8. AND THE DOCTORS HAVE ALL AGREED IN CONSIDERING INCUMBENT THE KNOWLEDGE (ma'rifa) OF ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH AND OF HIS POSITIVE AND PRIVATIVE QUALITIES AND OF WHAT IS PROPER FOR HIM AND OF WHAT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM AND OF PROPHECY AND OF THE IMÂMATE AND OF THE RETURN.

9. Those of the people of Muḥammad who have the power to loose and bind (that is, the *mullâs*, *cf.* Matt. 16: 19) have agreed in saying that a knowledge of these things is incumbent, and their agreement is a convincing proof for all—for us Shî'ites, because of the presence among them of the One Immune to Sin (*al-ma'ṣûm*, that is, the Imâm whose authority alone is sufficient for the Shî'ites); and for the rest (the Sunnites) because of the Prophet's word, "My people will not agree in an error."

10. And in addition to agreement, the proof that knowledge is incumbent is of two kinds, rational ('aqlî) and traditional (sam'î). (1) Now the rational proofs are two: (*a*) The first is that knowledge guards against the fear which results from differences. And guarding against fear is incumbent, for fear is pain to the soul. Now guarding against pain is possible. Therefore reason pronounces incumbent the guarding against fear, hence guarding against it *is* incumbent.

[From the presence of religious differences among men it is evident that many men do not know God, and that therefore they will go to hell. This results in fear, from which only the knowledge of God can save us.]

(*b*) Second, expression of gratitude to a benefactor is incumbent. But this cannot be done unless one knows him. Now it *is* incumbent, for all rational beings know that failure to express gratitude deserves blame. But it cannot be done without knowledge. For the expression of gratitude must be of a kind suitable to the condition of the one to be thanked, and that comes only from knowing him—otherwise it is not an expression of gratitude. Now the Most High Creator is a Benefactor. Therefore expression of gratitude to Him is incumbent. Therefore the knowledge of Him is incumbent.[a] And since *taklîf* (the imposition of a task) is necessary (wâjib) on rational grounds, as shall appear later (see pars. 131-143), it is incumbent that one know the announcer (muballigh) of it, that is the Prophet, and the guardian of it, that is, the Imâm, and the Return, because *taklîf* requires the necessity (wujûb) of requital.[b]

11. (2) Now for the traditional proof, which is of two kinds: (*a*) First, the word of the Most High, " Know then, that there is no god but Allâh " (47: 21). And this is a command making it incumbent. (*b*) Second, when there descended the word of Allâh, " Verily, in the creation of the Heavens and of the Earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding " (3: 186), the Prophet said, " Woe be to him who reads this with his tongue but has not reflected upon it !" Thus he attributes blame in case of failure to reflect upon it, that is, the failure to make deduction (istidlâl) from what the verse contained in the mention of the heavenly and earthly bodies, because in them are evidences of workmanship and power. And the knowledge ('ilm) of these things certainly proves the existence of their Creator (Ṣâni'), and His power and His knowledge. Hence reflection and deduction become incumbent, and that was what we were seeking to demonstrate.

12. AND ALL OF THIS IS BY PROOF (dalîl), NOT BY IMITATION (taqlîd).

13. And PROOF (dalîl) as a word means a *director* (murshid) and *guide* (dâll), and in usage it means a thing the knowledge

('ilm) of which necessitates the knowledge of another thing. And since knowledge (ma'rifa) is incumbent, it is necessary that it be acquired by means of reflection and deduction. For *ma'rifa* is not of necessity (ḍarûrî), for what is known of necessity is that in which rational beings do not differ. Now *'ilm* is acquired by means of the smallest cause by the direction of the mind upon it, or by the perception of it by the senses, such as the judgment that one is a half of two, and that fire burns, and that the sun is bright, and likewise that we are subject to fear and anger and strength and weakness and so forth.

14. But *ma'rifa* is not like that, because there is a difference of opinion about it, and because it cannot be acquired merely by the direction of the mind upon it, and because it cannot be perceived by the senses. Hence the first statement is demonstrated, because *'ilm* includes both necessary knowledge and speculative (naẓarî) knowledge. Hence speculation and deduction become incumbent. For that without which a thing absolutely incumbent cannot be performed and by which it is controlled is itself incumbent. (There are two kinds of obligations (wâjib), *absolute*, like namâz, and *conditioned*, like ḥajj.) Because whenever anything on which a thing absolutely incumbent depends is not itself incumbent, then the thing absolutely incumbent either remains incumbent or it does not. If the first be the case, then there becomes necessary a *taklîf* which cannot be performed, and this is impossible, as shall later appear (pars. 134-136). And if the second be the case, then it becomes necessary that a thing absolutely incumbent shall cease to be incumbent, and this also is impossible.

[That is, knowledge is incumbent, therefore investigation is also incumbent. For if it were not, then either a thing (namely, *ma'rifa*) would be incumbent which could not be attained—and this is impossible; or else a thing absolutely incumbent becomes non-incumbent—which is also impossible.]

15. And speculation (naẓar) is the orderly arrangement of known facts (umûr) in order to arrive at another fact. And in

explanation of this—first the soul (nafs) conceives the object sought, then it acquires the sound premises necessary for making a deduction, and then it arranges them in order so as to arrive at a knowledge of the object.

16. And it is not possible (jâ'iz) that knowledge (ma'rifa) of the Most High be by imitation (taqlîd). And *taqlîd* is the acceptance of the word of another without proof (dalîl). And this statement of ours has two aspects. (1) First, when mankind are equal in respect of knowledge ('ilm) and differ from one another in belief, then a *mukallaf* must either accept all that which others believe (in which case the agreement of things irreconcilable becomes necessary), or else he must accept some things and not others. In the latter case there is either something to cause a preponderance of opinion (murajjiḥ), or there is not. If there be something which causes the preponderance, then that is the proof (dalîl). But if there be not, then it becomes necessary for there to be a preponderance without anything to cause it, and this is impossible.

17. (2) Second, the Most High has blamed imitation (taqlîd) by His word, "But say they, 'Verily, we have found our fathers of that persuasion and verily by their footsteps do we guide ourselves'" (43:21). And He has incited us to speculation and deduction by His word, "Bring me a Book sent down by them before this Koran, or traces of their knowledge—if ye are men of truth" (46:3).

18. AND SO IT IS NECESSARY TO MENTION THOSE THINGS REGARDING WHICH IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A SINGLE MUSLIM TO BE IGNORANT, AND WHOEVER IS IGNORANT AS TO ANY OF THEM IS OUTSIDE THE BOND (ribqa) OF BELIEVERS AND DESERVES EVERLASTING PUNISHMENT.

19. Since the knowledge (ma'rifa) of the above-mentioned things has been proved to be incumbent, it necessarily follows that it is incumbent upon every Muslim. That is, he should affirm the two testimonies (that there is no god but Allâh and that Muḥammad is His Prophet) in order that through knowledge he should become a believer, according to the word of the Most High, "The Arabs of the desert say, 'We believe'

Say thou: Ye believe not; but rather say, 'We profess Islâm'" (49: 14). He denied faith (al-îmân)[a] to them, although they affirmed their belief in divinity and prophecy, because their faith did not derive its existence from speculation and deduction. And since reward (thawâb) is conditioned by faith, one who is ignorant of the knowledge of these things deserves everlasting punishment. For everyone who is undeserving of any reward whatever, provided he is in possession of the qualities which constitute the conditions of *taklîf* (see par. 5), is deserving of punishment by agreement (of all Muslims).

20. Bond (ribqa) is a long rope with space enough to bind animals within it. And the author uses the term metaphorically for the inclusive command which rests upon believers, the desert (for obedience to which) is reward and everlasting honour.

SECTION I

21. And he has arranged this chapter in sections. The first section is in proof of the self-existent (wâjibu'l-wujûdi li-dhâtihi, the necessarily existent in itself). So we say that every object of thought is either necessarily existent objectively in itself, or is possible of existence in itself (mumkinu'l-wujûd), or else is impossible of existence in itself (mumtani'u'l-wujûd).

22. The subject which is supreme and of extreme importance in this science is the Proving of the Creator (Ṣâni'). So he begins to do this. And as an introduction he gives a division of the objects of thought, because the argument to follow depends on this explanation. And in explanation of that, every object of thought (kullu ma'qûl) means the form (aṣ-ṣûra) which is acquired in the mind whenever we bring objective existence into relation to it. Then it is either sound for it (the objective existence) to be qualified by it (the mental image) in itself, or it is not. If it is not sound for it to be qualified by it in itself, that is *impossible existence in itself*, as (for example) the Creator's having a partner. But if it is sound for it to be qualified by it, then it is either necessary (wâjib) for it to be qualified by it in itself, or it is not. If the former be true, then it is the *necessarily existent in itself*, namely, Allâh the Exalted, and no other. And if the latter be true, then it is *possible of existence* in itself, namely, all entities (mawjûdât) apart from necessary existence.

23. But we have confined the "Necessary" (al-wâjib) to that which is *necessary in itself*, to guard against *the necessary because of something else*, such as the necessity of the existence of an effect when a sufficient cause is present. (That is, there are two kinds of necessary, *self-existent* and *existent in something else*—but the term *the Necessary* should be used only of the former.) So the effect is necessary, not in itself, but rather because of the existence of a sufficient cause.

24. And we have also confined the "impossible" to that which is *impossible in itself*, to guard against *the impossible because of something else*, such as the impossibility of the existence of an effect without its cause. And these two sorts (namely, the *necessary because of something else* and the *impossible because of something else*) belong to possible existence.

25. And as for the "possible," its existence does not come about because of something else, so it is of no use to confine it to that which is possible in itself, except to explain that it does not come into being except in that way. There is no need of guarding against anything besides.

26. We will end this discussion by mentioning two matters of importance on which the discussion that is to follow depends. (1) The first is the characteristics of the *necessarily existent in itself*, which are five: (*a*) First, its existence is not necessary both because of itself and because of something else at the same time, otherwise its existence would certainly be discontinued on the discontinuance of the existence of the other thing, in which case it would not be the necessary in itself, and that is contrary to the premises. (*b*) Second, its existence (wujûd) and its necessity are not additions (zâ'id) to it, otherwise it would have been in need of those two, and would then have been the possible. (*c*) Third, composition (tarkîb) is not true of it, because a thing composed is in need of parts distinct from it, and that is possible existence, and possible existence is not the self-existent. (*d*) Fourth, it cannot be a part of another thing, for then it would have been parted from that other thing, and that is possible existence. (That is, God has no father or source.) (*e*) Fifth, it cannot be true of two things, as shall appear in the proofs of the Unity (that is, there are not two necessarily self-existents).

27. (2) The second matter is the characteristics of the *possible*, which are three: (*a*) First, one of the two sides (I mean existence and non-existence) is not better for it than the other, but both are equal in relation to it, like the two sides of a balance. And making one of the two sides to preponderate certainly comes about by a cause outside of itself. For if one of them were better for it than the other, then the occurrence

of the other (that is, the worse) either comes about or it does not. If the worse occurs, then being better is not a sufficient cause; and if the worse does not occur, then the first supposition regarding it is necessary for it (that is, that one alternative is better for it than the other). In this case the possible becomes either the necessary or the impossible, and that cannot be.

28. (*b*) Second, the possible needs a mover (mu'aththir). For when the two sides (I mean, its existence and non-existence) are equal in relation to it, the preponderance of one of the two over the other is not possible unless there be something to cause a preponderance. And the knowledge of this is evident.

29. (*c*) Third, the possible-which-abides needs a mover, not only to bring it into existence (see *b*) but also to continue it in existence. But we have said this because possibility (al-imkân) is required for the quiddity of the possible, and possibility cannot be removed from it, otherwise its change from possibility to necessity or impossibility would be required. Now it has already been proved that need (iḥtiyâj) is required for possibility, and possibility is required for the quiddity of the possible. Now the requirement of something required is itself required. Hence the need of the quiddity of the possible is required—which is what we sought.

30. AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HERE (IN THE UNIVERSE) THERE IS THAT WHICH EXISTS OF NECESSITY. IF THIS BE THE NECESSARY IN ITSELF, THEN THAT WAS WHAT WE WERE SEEKING. AND IF IT BE THE POSSIBLE, THEN IT WOULD NEED A BRINGER-INTO-EXISTENCE (mûjid) WHICH WOULD BRING IT INTO EXISTENCE OF NECESSITY. NOW IF THE BRINGER-INTO-EXISTENCE BE THE NECESSARY IN ITSELF, THEN THAT WAS WHAT WE WERE SEEKING. AND IF IT BE THE POSSIBLE, THEN IT WOULD NEED ANOTHER BRINGER-INTO-EXISTENCE. IF IT BE THE FIRST, THEN IT IS A CIRCLE, AND THAT IS A FALLACY OF NECESSITY. AND IF IT BE ANOTHER POSSIBLE, THEN IT IS AN ENDLESS CHAIN, AND THAT ALSO IS A FALLACY. FOR ALL THE LINKS IN THIS CHAIN WHICH INCLUDES ALL POSSIBLE EXISTENCES (al-mumkinât) ARE POSSIBLE OF NECESSITY. HENCE THEY

SHARE IN THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EXISTENCE IN THEMSELVES. HENCE THEY NEED SOME BRINGER-INTO-EXISTENCE NECESSARILY OUTSIDE OF THEMSELVES. THEN THAT IS THE NECESSARY (al-wâjib) OF NECESSITY—WHICH WAS WHAT WE WERE SEEKING.

31. Among all the doctors there are two ways of proving the Creator: (1) First, seeking for proof in effects (âthâr) which need a cause for their existence, such as is indicated in His Mighty Book in the word of the Most High, "We will show them our signs in different countries and among themselves till it become plain to them that it is the truth" (41:53). And this is the way of Ibrâhîm the Friend, for he sought for proof in the settings of stars, which is disappearance, and that requires motion, and that requires becoming (ḥudûth), and that requires the Most High Creator.

32. (2) Second, that one should speculate (naẓar) about that which exists itself, and divide it into the necessary and the possible, that division may bear witness to the existence of the necessary from which proceed all of the possible existences which are separate from it. And there is reference to this in that which descended, in the word of the Most High, "Is it not enough for thee that thy Lord is witness of all things?" (41:53).

33. And in this chapter the writer has referred to both ways at once. He refers to the first in connection with His being powerful, the explanation of which is to follow (see par. 38). And the second is what is mentioned here. And as for his statement that thou shouldest say, "If the Necessary, the Most High, does not exist, then either a circle or an endless chain must follow," (it is clear that) both of the things necessitated are false; hence that which necessitated them, that is, the non-existence of the Necessary, is in like manner false. And there is need here of an explanation of both matters, first of the necessity for a circle and an endless chain, and second of the fallacy of both of them.

34. (1) Now in explanation of the first matter, (we would say that) there are here quiddities (mâhiyyât) which are qualified by objective existence of necessity. If the Necessary

exists along with them, then that was what we were seeking. And if it does not exist, then it becomes necessary that all these quiddities share in possibility, for there is no middle ground between them (that is, between the possible and the necessary). Then in this case they (the quiddities) must of necessity have a mover (mu'aththir). And if their mover is the Necessary, that is what we sought to prove. And if it is the possible, then it needs another to produce it. Now if that mover be what we first supposed (if it be caused by the *other* possible), it results in a circle. And if it be *another* possible, we will transfer the discussion to that and say what we said regarding the first—and the result is an endless chain. So the necessity (luzûm) of both of them has been proved (that is, either a circle or an endless chain must result in case there is no Necessary).

35. (2) And in explanation of the second matter, namely, the fallacy of the circle and the chain, we say: (*a*) that a circle means the dependence of a thing upon something which in turn depends on it, as for example that A should depend on B, and B on A—and that is a fallacy of necessity. For it would then be necessary that the first thing should be both existent and non-existent at the same time, and that cannot be. For when A depends on B, then A is dependent on B and on all on which B depends. And among the things on which B depends is A itself. Then A must depend on itself. And that on which something depends precedes that which depends on it. Then it is necessary for A to precede itself. And that which precedes, by the fact that it precedes, comes into existence before that which follows. So in this case, A comes into existence before itself. Hence it is both existent and non-existent at the same time, and that is impossible.

36. (*b*) And an endless chain is the arrangement of causes and effects in such a way that each one which precedes is the cause of the one which follows, and so on—and this also is fallacious. For all the individual links of this chain, which includes all possible existence, are possible because they possess the quality of need. Hence they all share in possibility. Hence they need a mover (a cause). And their mover

is either themselves or a part of themselves or something external to them. And all of these alternatives are absolutely fallacious.

37. First, it is impossible for a thing to be moved (ta'thîr) by itself, for otherwise it would be necessary for it to precede itself, and this is a fallacy, as was proved above. And the second is impossible, because if the mover of them (the units of the chain) be a part of them, then it becomes necessary for a thing to be the mover of itself, because it (the mover) is one of their number and also one of their causes ('ilal). Then it would have to precede itself and its causes—and this also is a fallacy. And the (proof of the fallacy of the) third alternative is of two kinds: (*a*) First, the thing external to them must be necessary (wâjib), since it is presupposed that *all* possible existences are united in this chain, and there remains no external entity (mawjûd) except the Necessary (al-wâjib). For there is no middle ground between the Necessary and the possible. Hence our conclusion has to be true. (*β*) Second, if the mover of each single individual of the links of the chain be something external to them, then two independent causes ('illa) would have to unite in producing one single effect, and this is a fallacy. For the supposition was that each of the links of this chain be the mover of the one that follows. (But according to this third alternative) it has been supposed that for each of the links there be also an external moving (ta'thîr). Then two causes would have to unite in producing one single effect, and that cannot be, otherwise it would have to be independent of the two causes, in spite of its being in need of them both. Then two contradictories would have to agree, and that is impossible. Hence the endless chain is absolutely false. So the fallacy both of the circle and of the chain has been demonstrated, and that was what we sought, namely, the existence of Allâh the Most High.

SECTION II

38. CONCERNING HIS POSITIVE QUALITIES (aṣ-ṣifâtu'th-thubûtiyya), WHICH ARE EIGHT. FIRST, THE MOST HIGH IS POWERFUL (qâdir) AND FREE (mukhtâr). FOR THE WORLD IS AN ORIGINATED THING (muḥdath), FOR IT IS A BODY (jism). AND EVERY BODY IS INSEPARABLE FROM ORIGINATED THINGS, I MEAN MOTION AND REST, BOTH OF WHICH ARE ORIGINATED THINGS, FOR BOTH REQUIRE CONSEQUENCE (masbûqiyya) IN REFERENCE TO SOMETHING ELSE. AND THAT WHICH IS INSEPARABLE FROM ORIGINATED THINGS IS OF NECESSITY ITSELF AN ORIGINATED THING. HENCE THERE IS A MOVER IN IT, NAMELY ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH, THE POWERFUL AND FREE. FOR IF THE CAUSE WERE A MECHANICAL CAUSE (mûjib) THEN OF NECESSITY ITS EFFECT (athar) WOULD NOT REMAIN BEHIND IT. THEN THAT WOULD REQUIRE EITHER THE PRIORITY (qidam) OF THE WORLD OR THE ORIGIN (ḥudûth) OF ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH, BOTH OF WHICH ARE FALSE.

39. When he finished proving the essence (dhât) he began to prove the qualities (ṣifât). And he placed first the positive qualities, for they possess existence (wujûd), while the negative qualities possess non-existence ('adamiyya). And existence ranks above non-existence, and that which ranks highest should come first.

40. And he began with His being Powerful, because creation requires power (qudra). And here we will make some introductory remarks which will include the consideration of the elements of this discussion.

41. We say then that the Powerful and Free is He who if He wills to do anything does it, and if He wills to leave it, leaves it; and who acts with purpose (qaṣd) and will (irâda). And a mechanical cause is the opposite. There are several differences between them—that is, between the free agent (mukhtâr) and the mechanical cause (mûjib): (1) First, the

free agent is able to act or cease from acting, while the mechanical cause is not. (2) Second, the act of the free agent is consequent upon knowledge and purpose and will, while the mechanical cause is not. (3) It is possible for the act of the free agent to follow it in time, while the act of a mechanical cause cannot be separated from it, as (for example) the sun's giving light and fire's burning.

42. And the *world* ('âlam) is all that exists besides Allâh the Most High. And an *originated thing* (muḥdath) is that which is consequent upon something else or upon non-existence ('adam). And a *prior thing* (qadîm) is the opposite of this. And *body* (jism) is that bounded thing (mutaḥayyiz) which receives division in three directions. And *ḥayyiz* and *makân* are one single thing, namely, an imaginary measure of space (farâgh) which bodies occupy by coming into it. And *motion* is the coming of a body into a place after being in another place. And *rest* is the second coming into one place.

43. Now that this has been explained, I say that since the world is a thing originated, there is in it a mover, namely, Allâh the Most High, the Powerful and Free. And (I have made) here two claims: (1) the first, that the world is an originated thing, and (2) the second, that its Creator must possess free will (ikhtiyâr). In explanation of the first claim, (I say that) by *world* (al-'âlam) the scholastic theologians mean the heavens and the earth and what is in them and what is between them; and that is either bodies (ajsâm) or accidents (a'râḍ), both of which are originated. (*a*) As for bodies, they cannot be quit of motion and rest, both of which are originated things, and all that cannot be quit of an originated thing is itself an originated thing. Now a body cannot be quit of motion and rest, because every body must necessarily have a place (makân). And since this is true, either the body remains in the place, which is rest; or it is removed from it, which is motion—for of necessity there is no middle ground between the two. But rest and motion are originated things, because they are consequent upon something else. And nothing prior is consequent upon something else. Then no motion or rest is prior. Hence both are originated things,

for there is no middle ground between a thing prior and a thing originated. And motion and rest are both consequent upon something else, because motion means the first coming (ḥuṣûl) into the second place, hence of necessity it is consequent upon a first place. And rest means the second coming into the first place, hence of necessity it is consequent upon a first coming. And all that which cannot be quit of originated things is itself an originated thing, for if it is not an originated thing then it is a prior thing. And in this case either it has with it in priority something that is originated, or it has not. If it has, then priority and origination would have to be united in one thing at the same time, and that cannot be. And if it has not, then that which has been known of necessity, namely, the impossibility of the separation of originated things from it, would have to be false, and that cannot be.

44. (*b*) And accidents are originated because they need bodies for their existence, and that which needs an originated thing is even more itself an originated thing.

45. (2) And in explanation of the second claim, (I say that) an originated thing, when its quiddity (mâhiyya) is qualified at one time by non-existence and later by existence, is possible existence. Then it needs a mover. If that (mover) be a free agent, then that was what we sought. And if it be a mechanical cause, then its effect (athar) cannot follow it in time. Hence its effect must be prior. But it had been proved that it is originated. Hence its mover must also be originated, for they are mutually necessary—and both things are impossible. For it has been demonstrated that if Allâh the Most High be a mechanical cause, there follows of necessity either the priority of the world or the origin of Allâh the Most High, both of which are untrue. Hence it is proved that the Most High is Powerful and Free, which is what we sought.

46. And his power is connected (yataʻallaqu) with all determined things (al-maqdûrât). For the cause which makes them need his power is possibility. And

THE RELATION OF HIS ESSENCE TO ALL THINGS IS EQUAL. HENCE HIS POWER IS UNIVERSAL.

[Determined things are possible existence. The relation of His essence to all possible existence is equal. Therefore His power extends equally to all determined things—that is, it is universal.]

47. When he had proved briefly that the Most High is Powerful, he began to explain the universality of His Power. And the philosophers (ḥukamâ) have disputed about it, when they said that He is One (wâḥid) and there proceeds from Him nothing but what is one. And the Thanawiyya thought that He did not have power to do evil (ash-sharr.) And an-Naẓẓâm[a] held that He did not have power to do what was evil (al-qabîḥ). And al-Balkhî denied His power over things like those which are in our power. And the Jubbâ'iyya held it impossible for His power to extend to those very things which are in our power. And reality (al-ḥaqq) is opposed to all of these.

48. And the proof for our contention is that every hindrance in relation to His essence and in relation to what is determined (maqdûr) has been removed. Hence the universal connection (ta'alluq) of His power is necessary. (That is, neither in Allâh nor in the thing determined is there any hindrance—hence His power extends to all.)

49. Now the exposition of the first statement (of the text) is that which necessitates His being Powerful in His essence. And the relationship (nisba) of His essence to all things is equal, because of its uniqueness (tajarrud). Hence that which is necessitated by it (namely, His Power) is also equally related, which is what we sought.

50. And the second statement is true, because that which necessitates a thing's being determined (maqdûr) is its possibility. And possibility partakes of everything (all creation is one in possessing possibility). Hence it is sound (ṣiḥḥa) for determination also to become a partaker in possible existences, which is what we sought. And when all hindrance in relation to the Powerful and in relation to what is deter-

mined is removed, then its universal connection is necessary, which is what we sought.

> [Allâh is Powerful (qâdir), and His power extends to all existence provided that neither in the *qâdir* nor in the *maqdûr* is there any hindrance. For instance, Allâh is able to create a partner, but in this case there is a hindrance, for a partner to Allâh is incapable of receiving existence.]

And know that the occurrence of everything connected with His Power is not necessary. Although He has power over everything, only some of the things over which He has power actually occur. And the Ash'arites agree with us in the universality of the connection (of His Power), but they claim that what He has power over always occurs, as will be explained later, if Allâh wills.

51. SECOND, THE MOST HIGH IS KNOWING ('âlim). FOR HE PERFORMS ACTIONS WHICH ARE FIRM (muḥkam) AND PERFECT (mutqan), AND EVERYONE WHO DOES THAT IS OF NECESSITY KNOWING.

52. Among the number of His positive qualities is His being Knowing. And The Knowing One is He to whom all things are clear in such a way that what is present to Him does not become absent.

53. And a FIRM AND PERFECT ACT is that which includes matters strange and wonderful and unites many characteristics.

54. And there are two proofs that He is knowing: (1) First, He is a free agent, and every free agent is knowing. The minor premise (that He is a free agent) was explained above. And as for the major premise, (know that) the act of a free agent follows his purpose, and to purpose a thing without having knowledge of it is impossible. (2) Second, He has performed firm and perfect acts, and everyone who does the like is knowing of necessity. Now that He performs such acts is manifest to whoever considers His creation: the heavenly bodies, on whose movements the characteristics

of the four seasons are arranged, as is explained in the sciences; and the things on the earth, in which there appears the wisdom revealed in the three kingdoms (murakkabât—mineral, vegetable, and animal), and in the strange things which are embraced by them, and in the wonderful characteristics which they possess. And if there were nothing else besides the forming of man, certainly the wisdom deposited in his creation and the orderliness of his formation and his senses and the benefits which depend on them would be sufficient (to demonstrate the perfection of Allâh's acts), as is indicated in the word of Allâh, "Have they not considered within themselves that Allâh hath not created the Heavens and the Earth and all that is between them . . . ?" (30: 7). And among the wonders deposited in man's constitution is this, that every one of his members has four powers, that of attraction (jâdhiba), retention (mâsika), digestion (hâḍima), and excretion (dâfi'a). As for attraction, since the body is constantly undergoing dissolution it needs the power of attraction that it may attract that which will replace what has dissolved from it. And it needs the power of retention, because the food which is taken in is slippery (lazij), and the organ is also slippery. Hence it must have the power of retention that digestion may take place. And the power of digestion is needed, because it changes the food into what is fitted to become part of the body of the eater. And excretion is the throwing off of the food which was in excess of what was digested, which was prepared because of another member. And everyone who performs actions which are firm and perfect is *knowing*, for this is self-evident to one who understands these matters and considers them.

55. AND HIS KNOWLEDGE IS CONNECTED WITH EVERY KNOWN THING (ma'lûm), BECAUSE OF THE EQUALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF ALL KNOWN THINGS TO HIM. FOR HE IS LIVING (hayy), AND IT IS PROPER THAT EVERY LIVING ONE SHOULD KNOW EVERY KNOWN THING. HENCE THAT IS NECESSARY FOR HIM, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HIS BEING IN NEED OF ANOTHER.

56. The Most High Creator knows everything that can properly be known, whether necessary or possible, prior or originated. This is contrary to the philosophers, in that they have denied that He has knowledge of parts (al-juz'iyyât) as *parts* (He knows them as a whole, not as parts), because change in them would necessitate change in the knowledge which resides in His essence. We reply that what changes is the relative connection, not the essential knowledge. And the proof of our position is that it is proper for Him to know every known thing—therefore this (knowledge) is necessary for Him. And it is proper for Him to know every known thing because He is Living, and everyone that lives can properly know (a dead thing cannot know, knowledge being a property of life). And the relationship of this propriety (for him to know all things) to all that is apart from Him is an equal relationship (that is, it is equally proper that He know all things). Hence the relation of all known things to Him is also equal. And the proof that whenever a thing is proper for the Most High, it is also necessary for Him is this: His qualities belong to His essence (dhâtiyya), and when a quality which belongs to the essence is proper it is also necessary, otherwise He would have need of something else, in that His essence was qualified by something other than He. Then the Most High Creator, as regards His knowledge, would be in need of something else, and that is impossible. (In both man and God knowledge is proper (ṣaḥîḥ), but while in man it is possible (mumkin); in God it is necessary (wâjib), for belonging to His essence it cannot be possible.)

57. Third, the Most High is living (ḥayy), because He is powerful and knowing—hence of necessity He is living.

58. Among His positive qualities is His being Living. And the philosophers and Abû'l-Ḥasan al-Baṣrî say that His life means the propriety (ṣiḥḥa) of His being qualified by power and knowledge. And the Ash'arites say that Life is a quality in excess (zâ'id) of His essence, as distinct from this propriety (as held by al-Baṣrî). And the first (the opinion of al-Baṣrî) is reality, for the root of the matter is its not being in excess.[a]

And it has been proved that the Most High Creator is Powerful and Knowing, hence of necessity He is Living, which is what we sought. (That is, Life is the essence itself, and so also are Knowledge and Power.)

59. FOURTH, THE MOST HIGH IS A WILLER (murîd) AND A DISLIKER (kârih), BECAUSE THE SPECIALIZING (takhṣîṣ) OF THE PERFORMANCE OF ACTS TO ONE TIME AND NOT TO ANOTHER REQUIRES THAT THERE BE A SPECIALIZER (mukhaṣṣiṣ), AND THAT IS WILL (al-irâda); AND BECAUSE THE MOST HIGH COMMANDS AND PROHIBITS, AND THESE THINGS REQUIRE OF NECESSITY WILL AND DISLIKE.

60. Now all Muslims are agreed that He has the quality Will, but they differ as to its meaning. Abû'l-Ḥasan al-Baṣrî said that it meant Allâh's knowing what advantage (maṣlaḥa) is in an act, as a motive for its performance (that is, when Allâh knows that a certain act is advantageous, then that knowledge is *will*, and becomes the motive for its performance). And al-Bukhârî said that its meaning is that Allâh is not overcome (maghlûb) and is not forced (mukrah). This meaning here is negative, and the speaker (al-Bukhârî) has taken in place of Will that which makes Will necessary.

61. And al-Balkhî said that in Allâh's acts *will* means His knowledge of them, and in the acts of others it means His commanding them. Now we reply, if he means by *will* absolute knowledge, then that is not will, as shall appear later. And if he means knowledge which is confined to advantage (that is, the knowledge of those things which Allâh sees are advantageous), then that is like what al-Basrî said. And His commanding it indeed requires will, but it is not will.

62. And the Ash'arites and Karrâmites[a] and a group of Mu'tazilites say that Will is a quality in excess of the essence, which is separate from Power and Knowledge, and belongs especially to His act. But then they disagreed among themselves—the Ash'arites say that this being in excess is a prior idea (ma'nâ); and the Mu'tazilites and Karrâmites say that it is an originated idea. And the Karrâmites say that it inheres (qâ'im) in His essence (as accidents inhere in a substance),

and the Mu'tazilites say it is not in a locus (maḥall), (that is, it does not so inhere, for Allâh's essence is not a place in which qualities can inhere). And the fallacy of this doctrine of excess will soon appear. And what al-Baṣrî said is reality, for two reasons.

63. (1) First, the specializing in the performance of acts at one time and not at another, and in one way and not in another, in spite of the equality of times and states in relation to the Doer and the recipient, necessarily requires a specifier (mukhaṣṣiṣ). And this specifier is either (*a*) the Power which resides in the essence, which is equally related to all things, and therefore cannot properly specialize—and, moreover, its function is moving (ta'thîr) and performing (îjâd), not preferring (tarjîḥ); (*b*) or else it is absolute knowledge—but that is consequent upon the appointment of the possible and the decree of its issuing. Hence it is not the specializer, otherwise it would certainly precede, and that is not possible. And it is clear that the remaining qualities cannot properly specialize. Hence the specializer is a special kind of knowledge (namely, knowledge of what is advantageous) which necessitates the appointment of the possible and the necessity of its issuing from Him. That is, it is knowledge that the possible contains an advantage which cannot be acquired except at that time and in that manner. And that specializer is *Will*.[a]

64. (2) Second, the Most High commanded in His word, "Establish the worship"; and He prohibited in His word, "Do not draw near to adultery." And command of a thing requires of necessity the willing of it, and prohibition of a thing requires of necessity the dislike for it. Hence the Most High Creator is a Willer and a Disliker, which is what we sought.

65. Now there are here two matters of importance: (1) First, His disliking is His knowledge that an act contains a cause of corruption (mafsada) which deters Him from performing it, just as will is His knowledge that the act contains advantage which is the motive (dâ'iya) for its performance. (2) Second, Will is not in excess of that which we mentioned (it is the essence itself, not in excess of the essence), otherwise it would

be either a prior idea (ma'nâ), as the Ash'arites say, in which case the plurality of prior things would be necessary; or else an originated thing. If the latter, then either (*a*) it would be a quality inhering in His essence, as the Karrâmites say, and He would be a locus for originated things—and that is false as shall appear later, if Allâh wills; or (*b*), it would be a quality of something else, and then it would be necessary for His command (ḥukm) to be referred to someone else, and not to Him. And Will is not in a place, as the Mu'tazilites say. For there are two errors in this: First, it necessitates an endless chain, because an originated thing is consequent upon the will of the originator. Then in that case Will would be an originated thing. Then if we move the discussion back a step it becomes a chain. Second, the impossibility of a quality's existing outside of a place.

66. FIFTH, THE MOST HIGH IS A PERCEIVER (mudrik), BECAUSE HE IS LIVING, AND IT IS THEREFORE PROPER FOR HIM TO PERCEIVE. AND THE KORAN HAS COME IN TO PROVE IT FOR HIM, HENCE IT IS INCUMBENT THAT IT BE CONFIRMED (ithbât) (by us by reason) TO BELONG TO HIM.

67. By traditional proofs it has been demonstrated that the Most High has Perception (idrâk). And Perception is (something) additional to Knowledge. For we find a difference between our *knowledge* of black and white and a terrifying sound and a pleasant one, and our *perception* of these things. And this addition is due to the impression (ta'thîr) of the senses. However, rational proofs lead us to believe that senses and organs are impossible for the Most High, and therefore this addition is impossible for Him. Hence in this case His Perception *is* His Knowledge of objects of perception (mudrakât).[a]

68. And the proof that it is proper for Him to have the quality of Perception is the same as that by which we proved that He knows all known things, (namely), by His being Living (see par. 56).

69. SIXTH, THE MOST HIGH IS PRIOR (qadîm) AND FROM ETERNITY (azalî) AND ABIDING (bâqî) AND TO ETERNITY (abadî),

BECAUSE HE IS THE NECESSARILY EXISTENT. HENCE NON-EXISTENCE, BOTH PREVIOUS (sâbiq) AND CONSEQUENT (lâḥiq), IS FOR HIM IMPOSSIBLE.

70. These four qualities are required in order that His existence be necessary (wâjib). And PRIOR is that entity the existence of which is not derived from anything else. And FROM ETERNITY is the being related to (muṣâḥib) the "ascertained ages" (the ages after creation—muḥaqqaq) and "implied ages" (the ages before creation—muqarrar), as regards the past. And ABIDING is existence that continues and that is related to all ages. And TO ETERNITY is being related to all ages, either ascertained or implied, as regards the future. And Eternal (sarmadî) comprises all ages.

71. And the proof of this is that since it has been proved that He is Necessarily Existent, non-existence is impossible for Him absolutely, whether it be previous, on the supposition (taqdîr) that He is not from all eternity, or consequent, on the supposition that He is not to all eternity. And since absolute non-existence is impossible for Him, it is proved that He is Prior and From Eternity and Abiding and To Eternity, which is what we sought.

72. SEVENTH, THE MOST HIGH IS A SPEAKER (mutakallim), BY THE AGREEMENT OF ALL. AND BY SPEECH (al-kalâm) IS INTENDED LETTERS AND SOUNDS WHICH ARE AUDIBLE AND ORDERLY. AND THE MEANING OF THE MOST HIGH'S BEING A SPEAKER IS THAT HE BRINGS SPEECH INTO EXISTENCE IN SOME SORT OF BODY (jism). AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE ASH'ARITES IS CONTRARY TO REASON.

73. Among the qualities of the Most High is His being a Speaker. And in that Muslims have agreed, but after that they differ in four points (maqâmât): (1) First, in the way in which they prove this quality. The Ash'arites say it is reason ('aql). And the Mu'tazilites say it is tradition (sam'), according to the word of the Most High, "And discoursing did Allâh discourse (takallama) with Moses" (4: 162). And this is reality (that is, the Mu'tazilite position), because there is no rational evidence (dalîl), and the evidence which they adduce

is not complete. Now all the prophets have agreed in this (that Allâh speaks). (And if one says that the very fact that there are prophets is a rational proof that Allâh speaks—for how could they speak unless He first spoke to them ?—we reply) that the proof of their being prophets is not dependent on this (that is, His Speaking), because it is possible to attest (the validity of the mission of) the prophets apart from Speech, for it is rather dependent on miracles, otherwise a circle would have to follow. (That is, the prophet says that Allâh is a Speaker, but the truth of his being a prophet depends on Allâh's being a Speaker.) Hence it is incumbent to prove (ithbât) it for Him. For it is possible to deduce (istidlâl) the truth of prophecy from miracles apart from the Koran, or else from the Koran considered not as Speech but as a miracle. And undoubtedly there is a disagreement (taghâyur) about miracles. Hence it is necessary to prove (by tradition that Allâh is a Speaker).

74. (2) As to the quiddity (mâhiyya) of His Speech. The Ash'arites thought it was a prior idea (ma'nâ) inherent in His essence which is expressed in various terms ('ibârât) and is distinct from Knowledge and Power. Hence it is neither letters nor sounds nor commands nor prohibitions nor narrative nor interrogation nor any other such form of speech.[a]

75. And the Mu'tazilites and Karrâmites and Ḥanbalites say it is letters and sounds compounded in such a way as to express something.[a] And this is reality, for two reasons: (*a*) First, that which takes precedence (al-mutabâdir) in the opinion of intelligent people is what we have mentioned (namely, that *kalâm* is speech), because they do not attribute the quality of speech to one who does not possess that quality, such as one who is silent or dumb. (Speech means speaking, not merely having ideas in one's mind, as the Ash'arites say.) (*b*) Second, what they have said cannot be conceived (ghayru mutaṣawwar). For that which they conceived is either essential Power from which proceed letters and sounds, and they have said that Speech is other than that—nor can the other qualities properly be the source of what they have said. And whenever a thing cannot be conceived it cannot be

properly proved, for attestation (taṣdîq) is consequent upon conception (taṣawwur).

76. (3) Third, as to that in which the quality Speech inheres. The Ash'arites, because of their doctrine that it is an idea (ma'nâ),[a] say that it inheres in His essence. And those who say that it is letters and sounds have differed among themselves. The Ḥanbalites and Karrâmites say that it inheres in His essence, so according to them He speaks with letters and sounds. And the Mu'tazilites and Imâmites say (and this is reality) that it is inherent in something else, not in His essence—as when He made speech to exist (awjada) in the bush, and Moses heard it. And the meaning of His being a Speaker is that He makes Speech, not that He is one in whom Speech inheres.[a] And the proof of that is that Speech is a possible thing, and God Most High has power over all possible existences.

77. And what we mentioned (namely, the Ash'arite doctrine) is to be rejected, for two reasons (sanad): (*a*) First, if a speaker be that in which speech inheres, then the air in which letters and sounds inhere would be a speaker, and that is not true. For the lexicographers do not call anything a *speaker* except that which makes speech, not that in which speech inheres, and in this way voice (aṣ-ṣadâ) is something other than a speaker. And they say that a jinnî speaks through ('alâ) the tongue of an epileptic, because they believe that the maker (fâ'il) of the speech that is heard from the epileptic is the jinnî.

78. (*b*) Second, Speech is either an idea (ma'nâ)—and the fallacy of this has been proved; or it is letters and sounds—and it is not possible for them to inhere in His essence, for then He would become the possessor of senses, because the existence of letters and sounds necessarily depends on the existence of their instruments. Then the Most High Creator would become the possessor of senses, and that is false.

79. (4) Fourth, as to the priority or origin of Speech. Now the Ash'arites said that the idea was prior. And the Ḥanbalites said that the letters were prior. And the Mu'tazilites said that Speech was an originated thing, and

that is the reality, for several reasons: (*a*) First, if it were prior, then a plurality of prior things would be necessary, and that is false, for the calling anything besides Allâh prior is infidelity (kufr) by the agreement of all.[a] Hence the Christians are guilty of infidelity in affirming the priority of the Persons (al-uqnûm). (*b*) Second, it is compounded of letters and sounds which become non-existent when succeeded by others. And non-existence is not possible for a prior thing. (*c*) Third, if it were prior then it would necessarily follow that Allâh lies. But that which is necessitated is false (namely, Allâh's lying), hence that which necessitated it (*kalâm's* being prior) is false also. And the proof of this necessity (of His being a liar) is that He informed us of His sending Noah from eternity (fi'l-azal), by the word of the Most High, "We sent Noah to his people" (71: 1). And He did not send him from eternity, since there is nothing previous to eternity. (If the word of Allâh was from eternity, then Noah must have been sent before eternity!) Hence it would be a lie.

80. (*d*) Fourth, if it were prior, then His word would be nonsense ('abath), in the word of the Most High, "Observe prayer and pay the legal impost" (22: 78), because in eternity there was no *mukallaf*. Now nonsense is evil (qabîḥ), hence it is impossible for the Most High. (*f*) Fifth, the word of the Most High, "Every fresh (muḥdath) warning that cometh to them from their Lord they only hear to mock it" (21: 2). And *warning* (dhikr) is the Koran, because of the word of the Most High, "Verily we have sent down the warning (adh-dhikr), and verily we will be its guardian" (15: 9), "For truly to thee and to thy people it is an admonition (dhikr)" (43: 43). And He has attributed to it the quality of origin (ḥudûth), hence it is not prior. And the word of the author and the statement that the Ash'arites are not to be accepted refer to what we have mentioned in these places.

81. Eighth, the Most High is veracious (sâdiq). For a lie (al-kidhb) is of necessity evil (qabîḥ) and Allâh the Most High is far removed from evil, because it is impossible for Him to have any imperfection (naqṣ).

82. Among His positive qualities is His being Veracious. And veracity is a report that corresponds to reality, and a lie is a report that does not so correspond. Because if He were not Veracious He would be a liar, and that is false; for a lie is of necessity evil, and it would be necessary for the Most High Creator to be qualified by what is evil, and that is false, because of what shall later appear. And a lie is an imperfection, and the Most High Creator is far removed from imperfection.

SECTION III

83. CONCERNING HIS PRIVATIVE (salbiyya) QUALITIES, WHICH ARE SEVEN. FIRST, THE MOST HIGH IS NOT COMPOUNDED (murakkab), OTHERWISE HE WOULD BE IN NEED OF MEMBERS, AND THAT WHICH IS IN NEED (muftaqir) IS POSSIBLE (existence).

84. When he finished the positive qualities he began on the privative ones. The first (the positive) are called the qualities of perfection (kamâl), and the second the qualities of glory (jalâl). And if you will, all the qualities may be qualities of glory. For the affirmation of His Power means the negation (salb) of impotence ('ajz) in Him, and the affirmation of knowledge means the negation of ignorance in Him, and likewise for the other qualities. And in truth what can be understood by our reason (al-ma'qûl lanâ) of His qualities is nothing but negation (sulûb) and relationships (iḍâfât). And the limit (kunh) of His essence and qualities is veiled from the consideration (naẓar) of reason ('uqûl). And no one knows what He is but He Himself.

85. Now the author mentioned here seven qualities. The first is that He is not compounded. And a compounded thing is one which has parts. And the opposite of compounded is single (basîṭ), and it is what does not have parts. And composition (tarkîb) is sometimes objective, as the composition in bodies of atoms (jawâhir) and accidents (a'râḍ); and sometimes it is mental (dhihnî), as the composition of quiddity (mâhiyya) and limits (ḥudûd), like the composition of genera (ajnâs) and species (fuṣûl). And a compounded thing in both senses is in need of its parts, because it is impossible for it, objectively or subjectively, to be realized and distinguished without its parts. And its parts are other than it, because the part can be separated from it. And the part is not called the whole. And that from which a thing can be separated is

distinct from it. Then a compounded thing is in need of something else, hence it is possible (existence). Therefore, if the Most Exalted Creator were compounded He would be possible (existence), and that cannot be.

86. SECOND, HE IS NOT A BODY (jism), NOR AN ACCIDENT ('araḍ), NOR AN ATOM (jawhar), OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE NEED OF A PLACE (al-makân), BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR BODY TO BE SEPARATED FROM ORIGINATED THINGS. THEN HE WOULD BE AN ORIGINATED THING, AND THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE.

87. The Most High Creator is not a body, contrary to the Anthropomorphists (mujassima). And BODY is that which has length and breadth and depth. And ACCIDENT is that which alights (al-ḥâll) in a body and has no existence without it. And the proof that the Most High is not an accident or a body is of two kinds: (1) First, if He were one of these two He would be possible existence. But this necessity is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And for the explanation of this necessity—we know of necessity (biḍ-ḍarûra) that every body needs a place, and every accident needs a locus (maḥall). And place and locus are other than body and accident. Hence they are in need of something other than themselves. And that which needs something else is the possible. Hence if the Most High Creator were a body or an accident He would be possible existence. (2) Second, if He were a body He would be an originated thing, and that is impossible. And in explanation of this, no body can be quit of originated things. And that which cannot be quit of originated things is itself an originated thing, as we have previously explained. Hence, if He were a body He would be an originated thing. But He is prior. Then contradictories would have to agree, and that is impossible.

88. AND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT HE BE IN A PLACE (makân), FOR HE WOULD THEN HAVE NEED OF IT; NOR IN A DIRECTION, FOR HE WOULD THEN HAVE NEED OF IT.

89. And these two qualities are negative. (1) The first is that He is not in a place, contrary to the Christians and some of the Ṣûfîs. And what is understood by incarnation (ḥulûl—

alighting) is the inhering (qiyâm) of one entity (mawjûd) in another entity in succession. And if they intend this meaning, then it is false. For then the Necessary would have to be in need, and that cannot be. And if they intend some other meaning, then first of all we would have to conceive it, and afterwards pass judgment on it, either rejecting it or affirming it.

90. (2) Second, He is not in a direction (jiha). And direction is the goal (maqṣad) of a moving object, and is connected with the world of sense. And the Karrâmites thought that He was in the direction of heaven (fawqiyya), and they supposed this from the literal meaning of a text (naql), and that is false. Because, if He be in a direction, then either He does not need it, in which case He will not alight in it; or else He does need it, in which case He would be the possible. And the literal traditional meaning possesses interpretations (ta'wîlât) and bearings (maḥâmil) which are mentioned in their proper place. For since corporeality (jismiyya) and what follows from it has on rational grounds been proved impossible for Him, then either (*a*) another interpretation is necessary—for it is impossible to use both (tradition and reason), otherwise contradictories would have to agree; or (*b*) both must be rejected, in which case both of the contradictories would have to be removed (a logical impossibility); or (*c*) tradition must be used and reason rejected, in which case reason also would have to be rejected, because of the rejection of its foundation. (Reason is fundamental (aṣl), tradition is consequent (far')—if the former is rejected the latter is impossible.) So (*d*) the fourth possibility remains, namely, the use of reason and the interpretation of tradition.

91. AND PLEASURE (al-ladhdha) AND PAIN (al-alam) ARE NOT VALID FOR HIM, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE MOST HIGH TO HAVE A PHYSICAL CONSTITUTION (mizâj).

92. Pain and pleasure are things that we perceive internally (wijdânî), hence they do not need explanation. And it has been said of them that pleasure is the perception of what is agreeable with regard to its being (min ḥayth) agreeable, and

pain is the perception of what is disagreeable (munâfî) with regard to its being disagreeable. And pleasure and pain may be either sensuous or mental. If the perception is by the senses they are sensuous, and if it is by the mind they are mental. Since this is determined, we say that pain is impossible for the Most High, as all reasonable beings agree, since He is subject to nothing that is disagreeable (munâfî—contrary to His nature). And pleasure, if it be sensuous, is likewise impossible for Him, because it results from having a physical constitution, and a physical constitution is impossible for Him, otherwise He would be a body. And if it be mental, the philosophers have affirmed it for Him, also the founder of the Ya'qûbigga (sect)[1] from among us. For the Most High Creator is qualified by His perfection, which is worthy of Him, for it is impossible for Him to have any imperfection. Nevertheless, He perceives by His essence and His perfection. Hence He is the Most Glorious Perceiver and the Most Exalted Perceiver by the most complete perception, and by pleasure we mean nothing other than that.

93. But the scholastic theologians have restricted their statements to the denial of pleasure to Allâh, either because of their belief that mental pleasure (also is) denied to Allâh, or because of its not having been mentioned in the Majestic Law. For the qualities of Allâh and His names are restricted, and it is not permissible for any but Him to venture into them, except with His permission. And even if pleasure is possible for Allâh from the point of view of (human) reason, yet it is not polite (to attribute it to Him), because it may perhaps be impossible (for Him) for some reason or other which we do not know.

94. NOR DOES HE UNITE WITH OTHER THAN HIMSELF, BECAUSE UNION (al-ittiḥâd) IS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM.

95. *Union* may be used in two senses, figurative and real. (1) Figurative union is one thing's becoming another thing in being (al-kawn) or in corruption (al-fasâd). (For an example

[1] The translator had written "the author of 'Ya'qût,'" which I have corrected by conjecture. R.A.N.

of being—water becomes mist; of corruption—seed in the ground dies and becomes a new plant.) Either (*a*) there is no addition (iḍâfa) of another thing, as their saying that water becomes air and air becomes water; or (*b*) there is an addition of something else, as it is said that dirt becomes mud by the addition of water to it. (2) And real union is when two entities become one entity.

96. Since that is determined, know that the first is altogether impossible for the Most High, because created being (al-kawn) and corruption are impossible for Him. And as for the second, some Christians say that He has united with Christ, for they say that the divinity (lâhûtiyya) of the Creator has united with the humanity (nâsûtiya) of 'Îsâ. And the Naṣriyya say that He has united with 'Alî. And some of the Ṣûfîs say that He has united with those who know God ('ârifîn). Now, if they mean something other than what we have mentioned it is first necessary to conceive it, then to pass judgment upon it. And if they mean what we have mentioned (namely, real union), then it is altogether false, because union is in itself impossible (there is no such thing as real union). Therefore it is impossible that it should be proved (to occur) in anything else. Now it is impossible, because if after the union of two entities they continue to exist, there is no union, because they are two, not one; and if they become non-existent together, this also is not union, but a third entity; and if one of them becomes non-existent and the other continues to exist, this also is not union, because non-existence cannot unite with existence.

97. THIRD, THE MOST HIGH IS NOT A LOCUS (maḥall) FOR ORIGINATED THINGS, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HIS BEING ACTED UPON (infi'âl) BY ANYTHING ELSE, AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMPERFECTION IN HIM.

98. Know that there are two ways of considering (i'tibârân) the qualities of the Most High: (1) The first of these refers to the essential Power itself and the essential Knowledge itself and to the other qualities themselves. And (2) the second refers to the connection (ta'alluq) which these qualities have

with the things determined (muqtaḍayât) by them, such as the control of Power over that which is decreed (maqdûr), and of Knowledge over that which is known. And, according to this second sense, there is no dispute about these qualities, being things which are relative, in addition (to the essence), and changing as the things with which they are connected change and vary.

99. But in regard to the first sense, the Karrâmites thought that the qualities are originated things and are renewed in like manner as the things with which they are connected are renewed. They said that He was not Powerful at first, but later became Powerful, and that He was not Knowing, but later became Knowing. And the reality is contrary to this. For what is renewed in what they mentioned is the relative connection. And if they mean that, it is self-evident. Otherwise, it is false for two reasons: (1) First, if His qualities are things originated and renewed, it would be necessary for Him to be acted upon and to change. But the necessity is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And there are two proofs of this: (*a*) First His qualities are essential, and their change would require the change of the essence and its being acted upon. And (*b*) second, the origin of the qualities would necessitate the origin of His ability to be a locus for them, and that would require the passibility and changeableness of the locus. But it is impossible for the nature (mâhiyya) of the Most High to be subject to change and passibility. Hence His qualities are not originated, which is what we sought.[a] (2) Second, the qualities of the Most High are perfect qualities, because it is impossible for them to have imperfection. And if they were originated and renewed He would not have perfection. And not having perfection is imperfection —and Allâh, the High, the Great, is exalted above that!

100. Fourth, ocular vision (ru'ya) of the Most High is impossible, because everything which can be seen possesses direction. For it is of necessity either opposite to one, or else it is like something opposite. Then He would be a body, and that is impossible. And

IN THE WORD OF THE MOST HIGH (to Moses) "THOU SHALT NOT SEE ME" (7: 139)—AND *lan* IS THE ETERNAL NEGATIVE.

101. The philosophers and the Mu'tazilites[a] hold that the vision of Him with the eye is impossible, because of his being incorporeal (mujarrad.) And the Anthropomorphists (mujassima) and Karrâmites hold that it is possible to see Him with the eye face to face. And the Ash'arites believe that God is incorporeal, and (yet) say that the vision of Him is valid,[b] contrary to the opinion of all sane men. And some of the Ash'arites say, "By *vision* we do not mean the impression (inṭibâ') (of the object on the optic nerve) or the issuing of rays, but the state which is acquired from the vision of an object after the acquisition of the knowledge ('ilm) of it." And others of them say that the meaning of the vision of Him is that He uncovers Himself (yankashifu) to believing creatures on the Last Day like the uncovering of a visible full moon. And the reality is that if they mean by that a complete manifestation (al-kashfu't-tâmm), then that is admitted, for on the Day of Resurrection perfect knowledge (al-ma'rifa) will become necessary (ḍarûrî). Otherwise it cannot be conceived except as ocular vision, and that is false both by reason and tradition.

102. (1) It is false by reason, because if He be visible He must be in a direction, and therefore be a body, which is false, as has been previously shown. For every visible thing is either opposite, or is like something opposite (fî ḥukmi'l-muqâbil), as the image in a mirror, and that is necessarily true. And everything opposite or like an opposite is in a direction. Hence if the Most High Creator be visible He must be in a direction, which is false. (2) And it is also false by tradition, for several reasons: (*a*) First, when Moses asked for a vision (of Him) he received the answer, "Thou shalt not see me" (7: 139), and *lan* is the eternal negative[a] according to the lexicographers. And since Moses did not see Him, certainly no one else has seen Him. (*b*) Second, in the word Allâh, "No vision taketh in Him, but He taketh in all vision" (6: 103). He describes Himself by denying that eyes can perceive Him. Hence proving that He is visible is a fault. (3) Third, He made a great matter of their seeking for a vision of Himself,

and attached blame to it, and threatened (the guilty), saying, "But a greater thing than this did they ask of Moses! for they said, 'Show us Allâh plainly!' and for this their wickedness did the fire-storm lay hold on them" (4: 152). "They who look not forward to meet us say, 'If the angels be not sent down to us, or unless we behold our Lord . . .' Ah! they are proud of heart, and exceed with great excess!" (21: 22).

103. FIFTH, A PARTNER (ash-sharîk) IS DENIED TO HIM, BECAUSE OF TRADITION; AND BECAUSE OF THEIR HINDERING ONE ANOTHER (in case of a plurality of deities), IN WHICH CASE THE ORDERLINESS OF EXISTENCE WOULD BE DESTROYED; AND BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPOUNDED, SINCE TWO NECESSARIES WOULD SHARE IN BEING NECESSARILY EXISTENT, IN WHICH CASE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A DISTINGUISHER (mâ'iz).

104. Scholastic theologians and philosophers have agreed in denying to the Most Migh a partner, for several reasons: (1) First, the traditional proofs which point to this, and also the agreement of the prophets, which is here a proof, because their veracity does not rest on their affirmation of the Unity. (2) Second, the proof of the scholastic theologians, which is called "the proof of hindrance." And that is taken from the word of the Most High, "Had there been in either heaven or earth gods beside Allâh, both surely had gone to ruin" (21: 22). And this means that if He had a partner, the destruction of the orderliness of existence would follow of necessity, and that is false. In explanation of this—if the will of one of the two (gods) came into connection with the production of a moving body, then undoubtedly it is possible for the other god to will its rest, or it is not: (*a*) If it is possible, then undoubtedly either the will of both will be carried out—in which case opposites would have to be reconciled; or else the will of neither of them will be carried out—in which case the body would have neither motion nor rest; or the will of (only) one of them will be carried out, in which case two evils will result: (*a*) first, preponderance (tarjîḥ) without any one to give preponderance, and (*β*) second, the impotence of the other (god). (*b*) If it is not possible for the other god to will its rest, then it necessarily

follows that he is impotent. For there is no hindrance except the connection of the will of that other god (with the body). But impotence on the part of gods is false, and preponderance without one to give preponderance is impossible. Hence the destruction of the orderliness of existence would be necessary, and that also is impossible.

105. (3) Third, the proof of the philosophers and its explanation. If there be in existence a Necessarily Existent, then both of the gods must be possible existence. For in this case they would both share in being necessarily existent. And undoubtedly they can either be distinguished from one another or they cannot. For if they cannot be distinguished they do not acquire duality. And if they can be distinguished, it is necessary that each one of the two be compounded of that in which they are one, and that by which they are distinguished. And every compounded thing is possible existence. Hence they both are possible existences, and this was contrary (to our premises).

106. SIXTH, IDEAS (ma'ânî) AND STATES (aḥwâl) ARE DENIED TO THE MOST HIGH. BECAUSE IF HE WERE POWERFUL BY HIS POWER AND KNOWING BY HIS KNOWLEDGE AND SO FORTH HE WOULD HAVE NEED IN HIS QUALITIES OF THAT IDEA. THEN HE WOULD BE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE, AND THAT IS CONTRARY (to our premises).

107. The Ash'arites hold that the Most High is Powerful by His Power and Knowing by His Knowledge and Living by His Life, and so for all His other qualities, and that these are prior ideas in addition to His essence and inhering in it.[a] And the Bahshamiya say that the Most High is equal to (musâwî) any other essence, and is distinguished from other essences by a state (ḥâla) which is called godhood (ulûhiyya). And this state produces in Him four states: being powerful, knowing, being alive, and existing. And *state* (ḥâl) according to them is a quality belonging to an entity (mawjûd), and existence (wujûd) and non-existence ('adam) do not possess this quality. And they say that the Most High Creator is Powerful in relation to (bi-i'tibâr) that state of being powerful

and Knowing in relation to that state of knowing, and so for the other qualities. And the fallacy of this contention is necessary (ḍarûrî), for a thing is either an entity or a non-entity, since there is no middle ground.

108. And the philosophers and the investigators (muḥaqqiqûn) among the scholastic theologians say that the Most High is Powerful by His essence, and so for the other qualities. And when we say, "the essence is Knowing and is Powerful," what is imagined to be an addition (zâ'ida) is relative and is addition only in the mind, not objectively. And this is the reality in our opinion, because if He were Powerful by His Power (qudra) or state of being powerful (qâdiriyya), and Knowing by His Knowledge ('ilm) or state of knowing ('âlimiyya), and so forth, then it would follow that the Necessary would have need of something else in His qualities. Because these ideas and states are distinct from His essence absolutely. And everything which is in need of something else is possible existence. And if His qualities be in addition to His essence, then He would be possible existence, which is contrary to our premises.

109. Seventh, the Most High is self-sufficient (ghaniyy) and not in need, for the necessity of His existence apart from anything else requires that He be without need of anything else, and that everything besides Him be in need of Him.

110. Among His negative qualities is His being absolutely self-sufficient and not in need of another, neither in His essence nor in His qualities. For the necessity of His existence, which has been established for Him, requires His being absolutely without need as regards all things beside Himself. For if He were in need (muḥtâj) He would have to want (iftaqara) something, and then He would be possible existence, and Allâh is exalted above that! Rather the Creator, whose greatness is glorious, is without need of anything besides Himself. And everything (that is) is an emanation (rashḥa—*oozing*) amongst the emanations of His existence, and a mote (dharra) amongst the motes in the rays of his munificence.

SECTION IV

111. CONCERNING JUSTICE ('adl). AND IN IT ARE SEVERAL SUBJECTS FOR INVESTIGATION. (1) FIRST, REASON (al-'aql) OF NECESSITY PASSES JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT ACTIONS ARE GOOD (ḥasan), SUCH AS THE RETURN OF A TRUST (fund) AND DOING GOOD (iḥsân), AND VERACITY WHICH IS PROFITABLE, AND AS TO WHAT ARE EVIL (qabîḥ), SUCH AS INJUSTICE AND AN INJURIOUS LIE. FOR THOSE WHO DENY ALL SYSTEMS OF LAW, LIKE THE MALÂḤIDA AND THE PHILOSOPHERS OF INDIA, JUDGE GOOD AND EVIL THUS; AND MOREOVER IF THEY ARE DENIED BY REASON THEY WOULD ALSO BE DENIED BY TRADITION, BECAUSE OF THE DENIAL OF THE EVIL OF LYING IN THIS CASE IN THE LAW-GIVER (ash-shâri').

112. When he finished the discussion of the Unity he began the discussion of Justice. And the meaning of Justice is that the Most High is far removed from every evil act and from being remiss in what is incumbent. And since Justice depends on the knowledge of good and evil as determined by reason, he introduced the discussion of that first. And know that an act the conception of which is necessary (ḍarûri) either has a quality in addition to its origination (ḥudûth), or it has not. An example of the latter is the movement of one who acts thoughtlessly (as-sâhî) and of a sleeper. And as for the former, either reason hates that addition or it does not —if it does, that is evil (al-qabîḥ), and if reason does not hate it, it is good (al-ḥasan). (That is, an act which one can know of necessity, such as the things we see and hear, either has a moral quality in addition to its occurrence, or it has not. If it has, and reason does not hate it, it is good—otherwise it is evil.)

113. Either (1) the doing and not doing of an act is equal, and this is *mubâḥ* (indifferent); or (2) it is not equal. And

(in this latter case) if the not doing of it is preferable, then if the opposite (namely, the doing of it) is forbidden it is *ḥarâm*, otherwise it is *makrûh*. And if the doing of it is preferable, then if the leaving it undone is forbidden, it is *wâjib*; or if the leaving it undone is permissible it is *mandûb* (or *mustaḥabb*).

(1) Doing and not doing *equal*: *mubâḥ*.
(2) Doing and not doing *not equal*:

(*a*) Not doing preferable:

(*α*) Doing it forbidden: *ḥarâm*.
(*β*) Doing it not forbidden: *makrûḥ*.

(*b*) Doing of it preferable:

(*α*) Leaving it undone forbidden: *wâjib*.
(*β*) Leaving it undone permissible *mandûb* (*mustaḥabb*).

114. Since this is explained, know that *good* and *evil* are used in three senses: (1) First, a thing's being a quality of perfection, such as our saying that knowledge is good; or a quality of imperfection, such as our saying that ignorance is evil. (2) Second, a thing's being agreeable to nature, as pleasures; or disagreeable to it, as pains. (3) Third, good is that the doing of which deserves praise in this world and reward in the world to come; and evil is that the doing of which deserves blame in this world and punishment in the world to come.

115. And there is no difference of opinion as to the first two senses being determined by reason. But the scholastic theologians have differed regarding the third sense. The Ash'arites say that there is nothing in reason which can guide to (a knowledge of) good and evil in this third sense, but law (must be the guide), and whatever it calls good is good, and whatever it calls evil is evil. And the Mu'tazilites and Imâmites say that there *is* that in reason which can guide to it, and that good is good in itself, and evil is evil in itself, whether the lawgiver pronounces it so or not.[a] And they reply to them (the Ash'arites) as follows: (1) First, we know of necessity that some actions are good, such as veracity which is profitable and fairness and doing good and returning

a trust and rescuing one who is perishing and other such things, without needing law (to tell us so); and that others are evil, such as an injurious lie and injustice and doing harm to one who does not deserve it and other such things, without having any doubt at all about it. For this judgment is inherent (markûz) in human nature. For when we say to a person, " If you speak the truth you will get a dînâr," and he be unprejudiced, by reason alone he will recognize the truth and desire to speak it.

116. (2) Second, if that which recognizes (mudrik) good and evil were law and nothing else, it would follow that they could not be known apart from it. But this necessity is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And the explanation of this necessity is that it is impossible of necessity for a thing conditioned to be binding apart from the condition. And the explanation of the fallacy of the necessity is that those who do not believe in a law, like the Malâḥida and the philosophers of India, do affirm that some actions are good and others evil without hesitating in the matter. For if this (knowledge) consisted in what is learned from law then they would not have pronounced an opinion.

117. (3) Third, if rational good and evil be denied, then it becomes necessary that legal good and evil be denied also. But all agree that this necessity is false. Hence that which necessitates it is false also. And the reason for this necessity (for the denial of legal good and evil), is the denial, in this case, of the evil of a lie on the part of the lawgiver, when reason does not pronounce it evil, so that he gives the lie to himself. And when the evil of a lie in him is denied, then the trustworthiness of what he tells us regarding good and evil must be denied also. (That is, till reason teaches us that a lie is evil, we cannot trust the lawgiver—for perhaps he is lying to us.)

118. (2) SECOND, WE ARE FREE AGENTS (fâ'ilûna bi'l-ikhtiyâr), AND NECESSITY REQUIRES THIS: (*a*) BECAUSE OF THE NECESSARY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MAN'S FALLING FROM THE ROOF AND HIS GOING DOWN FROM IT BY A LADDER—OTHERWISE OUR RESPONSIBILITY (taklîf) FOR A THING WOULD

BE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THEN THERE WOULD BE NO SIN; (*b*) AND BECAUSE OF THE EVIL OF HIS CREATING AN ACT IN US AND THEN PUNISHING US FOR IT; (*c*) AND BECAUSE OF TRADITION.

119. The belief of Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arî and those who follow him is that all actions take place by the Power of Allâh the Most High, and no action whatever belongs to the creature. And some of the Ash'arites say that the essence of the act is of Allâh, and the creature has *kasb*, which they explain as the action's being obedience or disobedience (that is, the moral quality of the act belongs to man, the act itself is Allâh's).[a] And some of them say that its meaning is that when the creature determines to undertake some thing, Allâh the Most High creates the act thereupon. And the Mu'tazilites[b] and Zaydites[c] and Imâmites say that actions which proceed from the creature, and their qualities, and the *kasb* which they spoke of, *all* take place by the power and choice of the creature; and he is not forced (majbûr) to act as he does, but he can act and he can refrain from acting, and this is the reality, for several reasons: (1) First, we find a necessary difference between the issuing from us of an action which results from purpose and motive, like the descent from the roof by a ladder, and the issuing of an action of another sort, like falling from the roof either by constraint or accidentally. For we have power to refrain from the first (action), but not from the second. And if actions were not ours, then they would all be of one uniform kind without any distinction. But a distinction is present. Hence actions are ours, and that is what we sought.

120. (2) Second, if the creature were not the bringer-into-existence (mûjid) of his actions, then his *taklîf* would be impossible, otherwise he would be responsible for what he is unable to perform. And we say this because in this case he would not have power to do that for which he is responsible. For if he were responsible, the responsibility would be for something which he was unable to perform, and this is false, by the agreement of all. And when he is not responsible (mukallaf), he is not disobedient ('âṣî) when he opposes (God's will), but by the agreement of all he *is* disobedient.

121. (3) Third, if the creature were not a bringer-into-existence of his actions, and did not have power over them, then Allâh would be the most unjust of unjust beings. For since the evil action proceeds from the Most High (not from man), it is impossible for the creature to be punished for it, for he has not performed it. But all agree that the Most High punishes. Then He would be unjust—but He is exalted above that!

122. (4) Fourth, the Mighty Book which is the Divider (furqân) between true and false teaches everywhere the relation (iḍâfa) of the action to the creature and its occurrence by his will, according to the word of the Most High, "Woe to those who with their hands transcribe the Book corruptly, and then say, 'This is from Allâh,' that they may sell it for some mean price! Woe to them for that which their hands have written! and Woe to them for the gains which they have made!" (2:73) ". . . they follow but a conceit" (6:116) ". . . So long as they change not what is in their hearts" (8:55) ". . . He who doth evil shall be recompensed for it" (4:122) ". . . Pledged to Allâh is every man for his actions and their desert" (52:21). And all the verses of promise and threatening and blame and praise (prove this), and they are more than can be numbered.

123. (3) THIRD, REGARDING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EVIL (qubḥ) IN HIM, BECAUSE HE HAS THAT WHICH DETERS HIM FROM IT, WHICH IS THE KNOWLEDGE ('ilm) OF EVIL; AND HE HAS NO MOTIVE FOR DOING EVIL, BECAUSE THE MOTIVE WOULD BE EITHER NEED, WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM, OR THE WISDOM (ḥikma) OF IT, WHICH IS EXCLUDED HERE; AND BECAUSE THE PROOF OF PROPHECY WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR EVIL TO PROCEED FROM HIM.

124. It is impossible for the Most High to be the doer of evil. This is the belief of the Mu'tazilites. But to the Ash'arites He is the Doer of everything, be it good or evil. And the proof of what we have said is twofold: (1) First, that which would deter Him from evil exists, and the motive for doing evil does not exist, and whatever is thus cannot come

to pass of necessity. Now as for the existence of a deterrent (as-ṣârif), it is the knowledge of evil, and Allâh the Most High knows it; and as for the non-existence of a motive—the motive is either need of it, and this is impossible for Him, because He needs nothing; or it is the wisdom of it, and this also is impossible, because there is no wisdom in evil. (2) Second, if evil were possible for Him, then the proof of prophecy would be impossible. But this necessity is false by universal agreement, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And in explanation of this necessity—in case He could do evil, the attesting of a false prophet would not be evil for Him, and in such a case assurance (jazm) as to the veracity of prophecy would be impossible, and this is self-evident.

125. Hence in this case the will to do evil is impossible for him, for it (that will) is evil.

126. The Ash'arites hold that the Most High is the Willer (murîd) of all contingent existence, be it good or evil, vice or virtue, faith or unbelief, because He is the bringer-into-existence of everything, and is therefore also the willer of it.[a] And the Mu'tazilites[b] hold that it is impossible for Him to will evil and unbelief, and that is the reality. For the will to do evil is itself evil. For we know of necessity that just as rational beings blame the doer of evil so also they blame the willer of it, and the command to do it. So the saying of the author, "in this case," stated the result, namely, that the impossibility of the evil act (in Him) necessitates the impossibility of the will to do it.

127. (4) Fourth, regarding the fact that the Most High acts with an aim (gharaḍ), because the Koran teaches it, and because the negation of it would result in vanity (al-'abath), and that is evil.

128. The Ash'arites hold that the Most High does not act with an aim, for if He did He would be imperfect, and would be seeking to perfect Himself by that aim. And the Mu'tazilites say that the actions of Allâh are effected (mu'allal) by aims, otherwise He would be acting in vain

and Allâh is exalted above that. And this is the opinion of our companions the Imâmites, and it is the reality, for two reasons: (1) First, the traditional—and the teaching of the Koran regarding this is clear, according to the saying of the Most High, "What! did ye then think that we had created you for pastime ('abath), and that ye should not be brought back again to us?" (23: 117); and, "I have not created Jinn and men but that they should worship me" (51: 56); "We have not created the heaven and the earth and what is between them for nought (bâṭil). That is the thought of the infidels" (38: 26). (2) Second, the rational proof is that if it were not thus (that Allâh has an aim in all His actions) it would necessarily follow that He acts in vain. But this necessity is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. Now the reason for its being necessary is evident. And the necessity is false, for a vain thing is evil, and one who is Wise (ḥakîm) does not engage in what is evil. And as for their saying that if He acted with an aim He would be seeking to perfect Himself by that aim, certainly if the aim benefited Him He would necessarily be seeking to perfect Himself, and He is not like that. But the aim is beneficial for the profit (naf') of the creature, or else it is because of the requirements of the order (niẓâm) of existence, and this does not necessitate a seeking for perfection (on the part of Allâh).

129. AND THE AIM OF ALLÂH IS NOT THE INJURY OF MAN, BECAUSE THAT IS EVIL, BUT (RATHER) HIS PROFIT (naf').

130. Since it is established that the action of the Most High is effected by an aim, and this aim concerns not Himself but others, then in such a case His aim is not the injury of others, for that in the opinion of rational beings is evil—as if one should give poisoned food to another with the purpose of killing him. And since the aim is not injury, it is certain that it is profit (naf'), which is what we sought.

131. HENCE THERE MUST BE *taklîf*, WHICH IS RESPONSIBILITY (ba'th) TO HIM TO WHOM OBEDIENCE IS DUE (wâjib) IN THAT IN WHICH IS LABOUR (mashaqqa) BY WAY OF A BEGINNING ('alâ jihati'l-ibtidâ) ON CONDITION OF KNOWING.

132. It has been proved that the aim of the action of the Most High is the profit of the creature. And there is no real profit except final reward (thawâb). For everything except that is either guarding against injury or acquiring profit that is not abiding, and it is not good that that should be the aim in the creation of man. Then final reward at the first is evil, as shall be explained later (that is, one must first labour, then receive a reward [see par. 143]). Hence wisdom requires that *taklîf* be the means (tawassuṭ) (of attaining reward). And *taklîf* is derived from *kulfa*, which means *trouble*, and in usage it is that which our author mentioned.

133. And *ba'th* for a thing is being responsible for it. And HE TO WHOM OBEDIENCE IS DUE is Allâh the Most High. So for that reason he says, "BY WAY OF A BEGINNING" (first of all), because the obligation to obey any other than Allâh, such as prophet, imâm, father, lord, or benefactor follows, and is a consequence of, obedience to Allâh. And his saying, "IN THAT IN WHICH IS LABOUR," was to guard against that in which is no labour, such as the responsibility of marrying, which produces pleasure, and of partaking of foods and drinks which produce pleasure. (Only those commands which require us to do distasteful things, such as *namâz* (worship), *rûza* (fasting), and so forth, must be obeyed, and have rewards and punishments. Allâh commanded marriage, but if one does not marry he is not punished, and if he does he is not rewarded.)

134. And his saying, "ON CONDITION OF KNOWING," means on condition that the *mukallaf* knows what task has been laid upon him, and knowing is one of the conditions of the *taklîf's* being good. And the conditions of its being good are three: (1) The first of these concerns *taklîf* itself, and is fourfold: (*a*) first, the absence of a cause of corruption in it, since such a cause would be evil; (*b*) second, its preceding the time of the act (we must be told our duty *before* the time to perform it); (*c*) third, the possibility of its performance, because *taklîf* for something that cannot be done is evil; (*d*) fourth, the presence (in the act) of a quality in addition to being good (ḥusn), since one is not responsible for (the performance of) *mubâḥ* (see par. 113).

135. (2) The second concerns Him who imposes the task (mukallif), that is, the Author (fâ'il) of the *taklîf*, and it is fourfold: (*a*) first, His knowledge of the qualities of an action, whether it is good or evil; (*b*) second, His knowledge of the measure of the reward and punishment which each single *mukallaf* deserves; (*c*) third, the power of giving to each one his due; (*d*) fourth, His not being a doer of evil.

136. (3) The third concerns the *mukallaf*, that is, the one upon whom rests the *taklîf*, and it is threefold: (*a*) first, his power over the act, because it is impossible for one to have a task imposed on him (*taklîf*) which he cannot perform, such as the *taklîf* of a blind man for a dot in the Koran, or of a cripple for flying; (*b*) second, his knowing what task has been imposed upon him, or the possibility of his knowing it, for the ignorant man who is able to know is not excusable; (*c*) third, the possibility of the means (of performing) the action.

137. Then that which is covered by *taklîf* is either knowledge ('ilm), or supposition (ẓann), or deed ('amal): (*a*) Knowledge is either rational, such as the knowledge of Allâh and His qualities and His justice and His wisdom and of prophecy and of the Imâmate,[a] or traditional, such as (the knowledge of) the religious ordinances; (*b*) and supposition is like (finding) the direction of the *qibla*; (*c*) and deed is like worship.

138. OTHERWISE HE WOULD BE AN INCITER (mughrî) TO EVIL, IN THAT HE CREATED (IN MAN) THE PASSIONS AND THE DESIRE FOR EVIL AND THE HATRED OF GOOD. HENCE THERE MUST BE A RESTRAINT (zâjir), AND THAT IS *taklîf*.

139. This is a suggestion that *taklîf* is incumbent on philosophical grounds. And this is the belief of the Mu'tazilites, and it is the reality, as opposed to the doctrine of the Ash'arites, for they do not make anything incumbent (wâjib) upon Allâh the Most High, either *taklîf* or anything else. And the proof of what we have said is that if it were not thus, Allâh would be the author of evil. In explanation of this, (we say that) He has created in man passion (ash-shahwa) and desire for evil and hatred of and aversion to good.[a] Hence if

He did not lay upon man as a task the incumbence of that which is incumbent and the evil of what which is evil, and promise (him rewards for obedience) and threaten him (with punishment for disobedience), then Allâh the Most High would be inciting man to evil, and inciting to evil is evil.

140. AND KNOWLEDGE ('ilm) IS NOT SUFFICIENT, BECAUSE BLAME IS EASY (to bear) IN ATTAINING AN OBJECT DESIRED.

141. This is the answer to a supposed question, namely, why the knowledge that one is worthy of blame for doing evil does not prevent one from doing evil, and why the knowledge that one is worthy of praise for doing good does not induce one to do good, in which case there would be no need for *taklîf*, because the aim would be realized without it? (This is the position of the Ash'arites.) The author answers that knowledge is not sufficient, because frequently man finds blame for evil easy (to bear), since by means of it he attains his object. This is especially true in view of the presence of sensual motives, which in most people triumph over rational motives.

142. AND THE REASON FOR *taklîf's* BEING GOOD IS THAT IT APPRISES (men) OF REWARD (ath-thawâb), THAT IS, OF THE MERITED ADVANTAGE WHICH IS JOINED (muqârin) WITH EXALTATION (at-ta'ẓîm) AND VENERATION (al-ijlâl), THE BEGINNING WITH WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE (that is, God cannot reward men for actions which have not been commanded them. Hence He *first* appoints them tasks, and then rewards them for doing them).

143. This also is an answer to a supposed question, the supposition being that the reason for *taklîf's* being good is either that it brings punishment, which is absolutely false, (for punishment is not a good), or that it brings reward, which is also false, and that for two reasons: first, the infidel who dies in his unbelief is a *mukallaf* in spite of his failure to acquire reward; and second, reward is decreed (maqdûr) by Allâh the Most High in the beginning, and therefore there is no advantage in *taklîf's* being a means of reward. The author

replies that the reason for *taklîf's* being good is that it apprises (ta'rîḍ) men of reward, not that it brings them reward. And apprising is universal as regards both believer and unbeliever. And that reward is decreed by Allâh the Most High in the beginning is admitted, but it is impossible for Him to begin with it except by means of *taklîf* (that is, to reward men without first appointing tasks for them). For reward consists of exaltation and veneration, and reason pronounces the exaltation of a person who does not deserve it to be evil. And the author says in explanation of reward, that it is "merited advantage which is joined with exaltation." Now advantage (naf') comprises reward (thawâb) and grace (tafaḍḍul) and recompense ('iwaḍ). Hence by the condition that it be merited, grace is excluded; and by the condition that it be joined with exaltation, recompense is excluded. (Recompense is merely wages paid—but Allâh does more—He pays us our due and exalts us besides. Hence this is not recompense but reward.)[a]

144. (5) Fifth, regarding the fact that kindness (luṭf) is incumbent upon the Most High. And luṭf is that which brings the creature near to obedience and keeps him far from disobedience. And it is no part (ḥaẓẓ) of ability (tamkîn), and it does not go as far as compulsion (al-iljâ'). For the aim of the imposer of tasks (al-Mukallif) depends upon it. For whenever he who wills an act from another (that is, when Allâh wills that man do something) knows that he will not do it except with the aid of an act which the willer can perform without any trouble, then if he does not perform it he would be contradicting his own aim, and reason pronounces that evil—Allâh is exalted above that!

145. On what does the performance of obedience and the refraining from disobedience depend? (1) First, on the presence of the power and means without which the act cannot be performed; and (2) second, on the presence of *lutf* (kindness), by which one who is responsible (*mukallaf*) for an act of obedience which he cannot perform without *lutf*

is enabled to draw near to obedience and refrain from disobedience, (for example, in worship the acts of kneeling, speaking, etc., are ours, by Allâh's *luṭf*).

146. And his saying, "IT IS NO PART OF ABILITY," refers to the first part, namely power, for power in actions is not *luṭf*, but rather a condition of their possibility. (My power to pray is not Allâh's kindness to me—rather it is the necessary condition of the possibility of my obeying the command to pray.) And his saying, "IT DOES NOT GO AS FAR AS COMPULSION," is true, because if it went as far as compulsion it would nullify *taklîf*.

147. And since this is settled, then know that *luṭf* is sometimes shown in the act of Allâh, in which case it is incumbent upon Him; and sometimes it is shown in the act of the *mukallaf*, in which case it is incumbent upon the Most High to inform the *mukallaf* of his duty and make it incumbent upon him; and sometimes it is shown in (the act of) someone other than Allâh and the *mukallaf* (namely, the prophet), in which case it becomes a condition of *taklîf* that one know the prophet, and that Allâh make incumbent on him that act (namely, delivering his message), and confirm it for him. And our saying that they (the three kinds of *luṭf*) are all incumbent on Allâh is because He would contradict His aim if this were not the case. And contradiction of aim is evil for Him.

148. And the explanation of this is that when He wills that someone perform some act, and knows that the man for whom it is willed will not perform the desired act unless the Willer aids him with an act which He performs with him, such as an act of kindliness (mulâṭafa) toward him or of correspondence with him (mukâtaba) or of sending to him or of striving for him, and so forth, in which there is no trouble (mashaqqa) for Him—then if He does not do these things which He had resolved to do, rational beings would judge that He had contradicted His purpose, and would blame Him accordingly. And like this is what (the author) said regarding the Most High Creator, that if, when He wills the performance of obedience and the removal of disobedience, He does not do that on which these two things depend, He would then be contradicting

His aim. And contradiction of aim is evil, and Allâh is exalted above that, the Most High and Most Exalted!

149. (6) SIXTH, IN REGARD TO THE FACT THAT AN ACTION IN RECOMPENSE ('iwaḍ) FOR THE SUFFERINGS (âlâm) WHICH COME TO MAN FROM HIM IS INCUMBENT UPON HIM—AND THE MEANING OF RECOMPENSE IS A DESERVED ADVANTAGE IN WHICH IS NO EXALTATION OR VENERATION—OTHERWISE HE WOULD BE UNJUST, AND ALLÂH IS EXALTED ABOVE THAT. AND IT IS INCUMBENT THAT IT BE IN EXCESS OF THE SUFFERING, OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE IN VAIN.

150. In the suffering which living creatures experience either some sort of evil is recognized (and that proceeds entirely from us); or else evil is not recognized in it, in which case it is good. And several things have been mentioned as to the good of pain: first, its being deserved; second, its containing advantage in excess (of the pain) which benefits the sufferer; third, its containing protection from injury in excess of the pain; fourth, its being common to man; fifth, its containing a sort of protection. And this good sometimes proceeds from the Most High, and sometimes proceeds from us. And that which proceeds from the Most High is for our advantage, and it is necessary that there be in it two things: (1) First, recompense for the suffering, otherwise He would be unjust, and Allâh is exalted above that. And it is necessary that the recompense be in excess of the pain to the extent that every rational being be satisfied. For it is evil in our opinion (fi'sh-shâhid) to cause anyone to suffer in order to recompense him for the suffering without (giving him) something in excess, because that would be in vain. (2) Second, there must be (in the suffering some) kindness (luṭf), either for the sufferer or for another, that it may not be in vain. But as for that suffering which proceeds from us in which there is some sort of evil—it is incumbent upon Allâh to avenge the sufferer of his tormentor, because of His justice ('adl), and because the Koran teaches it. And in this case the recompense must be equal to the suffering. And if it were not thus He would be unjust.

151. And here there are several matters of importance: (1) First, recompense (al-'iwaḍ) is a merited advantage in which is no exaltation or veneration. By the condition of being *merited* it is distinguished from grace (tafaḍḍul), and by the condition of being *without any exaltation* it is distinguished from reward (thawâb).[a] (2) Second, it is necessary that recompense be abiding (dawâm), because it is not good in our opinion (fi'sh-shâhid) for one to endure perilous woes and painful and great and laborious trials for a small transient advantage. (3) It is not necessary that the recompense be acquired in this world, for possibly Allâh knows that there is an advantage in its delay. Hence, it is sometimes acquired in this world, and sometimes it is not. (4) He who receives the recompense for his sufferings at the last day will be either of those who are rewarded or of those who are punished. And if he be of those who are rewarded, then it is sufficient for Allâh to give him his recompense, that is, that He divide it up into periods, or that He show grace to him in some such way. (The Ash'arites say that Paradise is in itself sufficient reward for pain, but the Shî'ites say that a recompense is also necessary.) And if he be of those who are punished, Allâh will cancel a part of his punishment because of his former sufferings, in such a way that the lightening of it will not be evident to him, since He will divide the measure of it into periods. (5) The suffering which proceeds from us to others, either by the command (amr) of the Most High or else by His permission, and that which proceeds from creatures such as the dumb brutes, and like the wasting of profit for the advantage of someone else which proceeds from Him, and the downpour of woes which come from something other than the act of man—the recompense for all this is incumbent upon Allâh the Most High, because of His Justice ('adl) and His Mercy (karam).

SECTION V

152. CONCERNING PROPHECY: THE PROPHET (an-nabî)—ON HIM BE PEACE!—IS A MAN WHO BRINGS A MESSAGE (al-mukhbir) FROM ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH WITHOUT THE MEDIATION OF ANY HUMAN BEING.

153. When he had finished the discussion of Justice he connected with it the discussion of Prophecy, because of its being a branch of it. And he defined the Prophet as A MAN WHO BRINGS A MESSAGE FROM ALLÂH WITHOUT THE MEDIATION OF ANY HUMAN BEING. And by the term "MAN," angel is excluded. And by the term, "A BRINGER OF A MESSAGE FROM ALLÂH," every one is excluded who brings a message from any besides Allâh. And by the term (which requires) the absence of human mediation, the Imâm and the doctor (ʿâlim) are excluded, for they are bringers of a message from Allâh through the mediation of the Prophet.

154. Since this is settled, then know that (the existence of) Prophecy and its being good (ḥusn) are necessary (wâjib) on philosophical grounds, contrary to the Barahmiyya and the Ashʿarites.[a] And the proof of this is that since the purpose in the bringing of mankind into existence is the advantage (maṣlaḥa) which accrues to them (that is, Allâh creates man not for His own glory but for man's good), then bringing them near to that in which their advantage consists and restraining them from that which would corrupt them is necessary on philosophical grounds. And that is (true), either in their present state or their future state.

155. (1) As for their present state, since for the preservation of the human race necessity requires a society (ijmâʿ), and since in a society every individual opposes his companion in seeking what he needs, then a society must result in contentions and disagreements which arise from the love which every individual has for himself and the desire that he has for his own profit, not for that of another, so that it would end

in the corruption and extinction of the race. Hence wisdom demands the existence of justice which will ordain a law to be put into effect among men in such a way that every individual may obey its commands and heed its prohibitions. Then if that law were ordained for them, the result would be the same as at first (namely, disorder and anarchy), because every individual has his own opinion which his reason and desire dictate and his nature necessitates. Hence in such a case there must be a lawgiver who can distinguish between the verses (âyât) and teachings (of the Koran) which prove his own veracity, that a proclaimer be appointed for the law by Allâh to promise rewards to the obedient and to threaten with punishment the disobedient, that he may invite man to obey his commands and prohibitions.

156. (2) And as to their future state—now since final blessedness (sa'âda) is not acquired except by the perfection of the soul (nafs) by real knowledge and right actions, and since attachment to the things of the world and the absorption of the mind in the garment of flesh prevent the attainment of that in the most complete manner and the most direct way, or if it is attained it is mingled with doubt and opposed by fear—hence in such a case the existence of a person is required who does not have that hindering attachment, so that he can give them proofs and make them plain to them, and make doubts to vanish and protect men from them, and assist that to which their reasons guide them (that is, natural religion), and explain that to which they have not been guided (namely, perfect knowledge), and remind them of their Creator and their Object of Worship, and appoint them acts of devotion ('ibâdât) and right actions, what they are and how they are to be performed, in order to secure for them nearness to Allâh, and repeat them for men in order that they may through repetition seek to keep his admonitions, lest carelessness and forgetfulness, which are man's second nature, overcome them And this person who is needed both for the present and the future state is the Prophet. Hence (the existence of) the Prophet is necessary (wâjib) on philosophical grounds, and that is what we sought.

157. AND IN THIS THERE ARE SEVERAL SUBJECTS FOR INVESTIGATION. (1) FIRST, REGARDING THE PROPHETIC MISSION (nubuwwa) OF OUR PROPHET MUḤAMMAD B. 'ABDU'LLÂH B. 'ABDU'L-MUṬṬALIB, THE MESSENGER OF ALLÂH (UPON HIM BE PEACE !). (And he is a prophet) BECAUSE MIRACLES (mu'jiza) WERE WROUGHT BY HIS HAND, SUCH AS THE KORAN AND THE SPLITTING OF THE MOON AND THE ISSUING OF WATER FROM BETWEEN HIS FINGERS AND THE FEEDING OF A GREAT MULTITUDE WITH A LITTLE FOOD AND THE PRAISING ALLÂH OF PEBBLES IN HIS HAND, AND HIS MIRACLES WERE MORE THAN CAN BE NUMBERED. NOW HE CLAIMED TO BE A PROPHET. HENCE HE IS VERACIOUS (ṣâdiq), OTHERWISE THE INCITING OF THE *mukallaf* TO EVIL WOULD BE NECESSARY, AND THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE.

158. Since problems vary according to the changing of the times and of people, as in the case of a sick person whose condition changes as regards the nature of his cure and the use of medicines according to the variation of his constitution and the fluctuation of his disease, so that at one time he is cured by something which at another time would not be able to cure him, therefore prophecy and laws (sharî'a) must vary according to the variation of the problems of man in different ages. And this is the mystery in the abrogation of some codes of laws by others, till prophecy and law culminated (intahat) in our Prophet Muḥammad, whose prophecy and law by the demands of reason (al-ḥikma) abrogate (nâsikh) that which preceded them, and will themselves abide so long as *taklîf* abides.

159. And the proof of the validity of his prophetic mission is that he claimed to be a prophet, and miracles were wrought by his hand, and whoever is thus is really a prophet. Therefore we need to explain three matters: first, that he claimed to be a prophet; second, that miracles were wrought by his hand; and third, that whoever is thus is really a prophet. (1) As for the first, it is proved by the agreement of all men, so that no one denies it.

160. (2) And as for the second—now a miracle (mu'jiza) is a thing (amr) which breaks in upon the ordinary course of nature in accordance with a claim (*e.g.*, he must first say, " I

will heal this blind man," and then heal him), and united with a purpose (taḥaddî), the doing of the like of which is impossible for man. If it does not break in upon the ordinary course of nature, then it is no miracle, as, for instance, the rising of the sun in the east. And it must accord with a claim, because it is to prove the truth of that which he claims. For if the miracle did not so accord, as in the case of Musaylima the Liar,[a] then it would not prove his veracity. And it is impossible for men to do the like of it, because if it should occur frequently it would not attest (the truth of) prophecy.

161. Now there is no doubt that miracles were wrought by the hand of our prophet, and this is known by *tawâtur* (trustworthy tradition which has come down by a number of independent lines without a break), which acquaints us with necessary knowledge ('ilm). And among his miracles is the Gracious Koran with which he challenges (taḥaddâ) men and seeks from them the bringing of its like. But they have not been able to do it. For the eloquent orators of the purest Arabs were impotent, and their impotence even led them to war and fighting which resulted in the loss of their lives and property and the captivity of their wives and children. For since they were better able to defend themselves against that (the miracle of the Koran) because of their mastery of individual words and the arrangement of them, inasmuch as they were people of eloquence and style and speech and oratory and conversation and repartee, their turning back from that to war is a proof of their impotence. For a rational creature will never choose the harder course when the easier is open to him, except when he is impotent to do the easier.

162. And others of his miracles are the splitting of the moon, and the gushing of water from between his fingers, and the feeding of a great multitude with a little food, and the praising of Allâh of pebbles in his hand, and the speech of the poisoned wild calf (warning Muḥammad not to eat it), and the moaning of the five-year-old camel (warning him of danger), and the speech of dumb animals, and the telling of things hidden, and the answering of his prayers, and others that cannot be numbered for multitude which are known from books of

miracles and history. So that the record of more than one thousand miracles has been preserved, the greatest and most exalted of which is the Mighty Book—"Falsehood, from whatever side it cometh, shall not come nigh it; it is a missive sent down from the Wise, the Praiseworthy" (41: 42)—which their hearts did not embrace and which their ears did not hear, and by the excessive rejection of which (the like of it) was not produced, and the darkness has not been illumined except by it.

163. (3) As for the third, if he were not veracious in his claim to be a prophet, then he would be a liar. And that is false, since it would necessitate the inciting of *mukallafs* to obey a liar, and that is evil which the Wise (Allâh) would not commit.

164. (2) SECOND, REGARDING HIS IMMUNITY TO SIN ('iṣma). AND IMMUNITY TO SIN IS A HIDDEN KINDNESS (luṭf) WHICH ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH SHOWS TO (the Prophet) ON WHOM HE HAS LAID THIS TASK (mukallaf), THAT HE MAY HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO FORSAKE OBEDIENCE AND TO COMMIT SIN (ma'ṣiya), ALTHOUGH HE HAS THE POWER (qudra) TO DO SO. FOR IF IT WERE NOT SO ONE COULD HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN HIS WORD. THEN THE VALUE OF HIS PROPHETIC MISSION WOULD BE NULLIFIED, AND THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE.

165. Know that a person immune to sin (ma'ṣûm) shares with others in the kindnesses which bring men near to Allâh. And in addition to that, because of the nature of his soul (malaka nafsâniyya), he enjoys a special form of kindness which Allâh bestows upon him, so that because of that he does not choose to forsake obedience and to commit sin, although he has the ability to do so. (An angel does not have that ability.) And some hold that the *Ma'ṣûm* cannot commit sin, and this is false, otherwise he would deserve no praise.

166. Now that this is settled, know that there is a difference of opinion regarding the immunity of the prophets to sin. And the Khârijites (al-Khawârij) held that sins (dhunûb) were possible for them, and according to them all sin is infidelity. And the Ḥashwites[a] held that it was possible for them to commit the great sins. And some of them denied

(that they committed them) intentionally but not that they committed them unintentionally, and they held that the intentional committing of small sins was possible. And the Ash'arites denied absolutely that they could commit the great sins, but they allowed the small ones unintentionally committed. And the Imâmites have made immunity to all sin, intentional and unintentional, absolutely necessary (wâjib), and that is the reality, for two reasons: (1) The first is that to which the author referred, and his explanation is that if the prophets were not *ma'ṣûm* the value of their mission would be nullified. And this necessity is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And the explanation of this necessity is that when disobedience is possible for them no confidence can be placed in their word, because in this case a lie would be possible (jâ'iz) for them. And when no confidence could be placed in them, then their commands and prohibitions would not be obeyed. Then the value of their mission would be nullified, and that is impossible. (2) Second, if sin (dhanb) proceeded from them it would (still) be incumbent to follow them, because tradition teaches that to follow them is incumbent. But that would be impossible, for it would be evil (to follow a man who is a sinner). Hence it is impossible for sin to proceed from them, which is what we sought.

167. (3) THIRD, HE IS IMMUNE TO SIN FROM THE FIRST OF HIS LIFE TO THE LAST OF IT, BECAUSE THE HEARTS OF MEN WILL NOT BE BOUND IN OBEDIENCE TO ONE IN WHOM HAS BEEN OBSERVED DURING HIS PAST LIFE VARIOUS SINS GREAT AND SMALL AND THAT WHICH THE SOUL HATES.

168. Those whom we mentioned (the Ash'arites) who assert the immunity of the prophets to sin hold that this applies to them only after their inspiration (waḥy), though they deny that they were previously guilty of infidelity and repeated sin. And our companions (the Imâmites) say that immunity to sin is absolutely necessary (wâjib) both before inspiration and after it to the end of life. And the proof of that is what the author mentioned, and it is self-evident.

169. And that which is found in the Mighty Book (47: 21), "Ask pardon for thy sin (dhanb)!", and in the traditions

which might lead one to imagine that they had been guilty of sin involves (only) their leaving the better course (tarku'l-awlâ). Thus what reason teaches us harmonizes with the veracity of tradition, although all of this which has been mentioned has various aspects and implications. And thou canst read the book, "The Clearing of the Prophets" (Tanzîhu'l-Anbiyâ), which Sayyid Murtaḍâ 'Alamu'l-Hudâ al-Mûsawî composed, and other books also, and if I did not fear to prolong the discussion I would quote a sample of it.

170. (4) FOURTH, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PROPHET BE THE BEST (afḍal) OF THE PEOPLE OF HIS AGE, BECAUSE IT IS EVIL BOTH BY REASON AND TRADITION FOR AN INFERIOR (al-mafḍûl) TO HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER A SUPERIOR (al-fâḍil). ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH SAYS, "IS HE THEN WHO GUIDETH INTO THE TRUTH THE MORE WORTHY TO BE FOLLOWED, OR HE WHO GUIDETH NOT UNLESS HE BE HIMSELF GUIDED? WHAT THEN HATH BEFALLEN YOU THAT YE SO JUDGE?" (10: 36).

171. It is necessary (wâjib) that the Prophet possess all the qualities of perfection and superiority, and it is necessary that he be in that respect superior to and more perfect than every individual of the people of his age. For it is evil, both by reason and tradition, for the Wise and Omniscient (Allâh) to give to the inferior who needs perfecting precedence over the superior and the perfector. (It is evil) by reason, as is evident, since it is evil in the opinion of authorities to make a beginner in jurisprudence take precedence over Ibn 'Abbâs and others like him among the lawyers, or to make a beginner in logic take precedence over Aristotle, or to make a beginner in grammar take precedence over Sîbawaihi and al-Khalîl,[a] and so in all the sciences. And (it is evil) by tradition, as the Praised One indicated in the verses quoted and in others.

172. (5) FIFTH, IT IS NECESSARY THAT HE BE FAR REMOVED FROM BASENESS (danâ'a) ON THE PART OF HIS MALE ANCESTRY AND FROM DEBAUCHERY ('ihr) OF THE FEMALE, AND FROM DEFECTS IN HIS CREATION AND FROM FLAWS IN CREATION, SINCE THAT WOULD BE IMPERFECTION. THEN HE WOULD

LOSE HIS PLACE IN MEN'S HEARTS, AND THAT IS CONTRARY TO WHAT WE ARE SEEKING.

173. Since what is sought in creation is complete attachment (inqiyâd) to the prophet and that men's hearts should welcome him, it is necessary that he possess the qualities that are praiseworthy, such as the perfection of reason and of sagacity and of prudence, and the absence of forgetfulness, and strength of opinion and of vigour and of greatness and of self-restraint and of courage and of generosity and of liberality and of bounty and of kindness and of zeal and of tenderness and of mercy and of humility and of meekness, and so forth, and that he be free from everything which would cause imperfection in Him. And that would be caused either by his relationship to something outside himself, such as the baseness of his fathers and the debauchery of his mothers; or by his relationship to himself, and that is either: (1) in his condition (aḥwâl), such as eating on the road (an unseemly thing for a prophet), and association with corrupt people, and that he should be a silk-weaver who weaves with his feet, or that he should bleed people, or be a street-sweeper, or have any such base occupation; or (2) in his character (akhlâq), such as rancour and ignorance and malice and envy and harshness and rudeness and avarice and cowardice and covetousness of the world and desire for it and paying attention to the people of the world and excusing them from Allâh's commands and other such faults; or (3) in his nature (ṭabî'a), such as leprosy and elephantiasis (judhâm) and insanity and dumbness and imperfection of mind, for in all this there is imperfection which would cause him to lose his place in men's hearts.

SECTION VI

174. *Concerning the Imâmate.* AND IT CONTAINS SEVERAL SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. (1) FIRST, THE IMÂMATE IS A UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY (riyâsa) IN THE THINGS OF RELIGION AND OF THE WORLD BELONGING TO SOME PERSON AND DERIVED FROM (niyâba) THE PROPHET. AND IT IS NECESSARY (wâjib) ACCORDING TO REASON. FOR THE IMÂMATE IS A KINDNESS (from Allâh) (luṭf), AND WE KNOW ABSOLUTELY THAT WHEN MEN HAVE A CHIEF (ra'îs) AND A GUIDE (murshid) WHOM THEY OBEY, WHO AVENGES THE OPPRESSED OF HIS OPPRESSOR AND RESTRAINS THE OPPRESSOR FROM HIS OPPRESSION, THEN THEY DRAW NEAR TO SOUNDNESS (ṣalâḥ) AND DEPART FROM CORRUPTION. AND WE HAVE SHOWN PREVIOUSLY THAT KINDNESS IS INCUMBENT UPON ALLÂH.[a]

175. This is the discussion of the Imâmate, which follows Prophecy, and is a branch of it. Now "THE IMÂMATE IS A UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY IN THE THINGS OF RELIGION AND OF THE WORLD BELONGING TO A PERSON" . . . And its being universal is the division (faṣl) which distinguishes it from the dominion (wilâya) of judges and vicegerents. And "IN THE THINGS OF RELIGION AND OF THE WORLD," explains that to which it appertains. Hence it concerns the world as well as religion. And its BELONGING TO A PERSON calls attention to two matters: first, he who is worthy of the Imâmate is a person appointed and specified by Allâh and His Prophet, not any chance person; and second, it is not possible that there be more than one individual at any one period who is worthy of it. And some of the learned (fudalâ) have added to the definition something regarding its being fundamental (al-iṣâla), and have said in the definition of the Imâmate that it is a universal authority in the things of religion and of the world belonging to a person by fundamental right. And in this way they guarded against a vicegerent (nâ'ib) to whom the Imâm would give universal dominion. And such an authority would be

universal, but not fundamentally so. But in reality he would be excluded by the condition of its being universal, for the above-mentioned vicegerent would not have authority over his Imâm, and hence his authority would not be universal. And in all this the definition of the Imâmate corresponds with that of Prophecy. Hence in this case there must be added to it the words, "by the right of vicegerency derived from the Prophet," or "by means of a man" (that is, not from Allâh direct, but through the mediation of the Prophet).

176. Since thou hast grasped this, then know that men have disagreed as to whether the Imamâte is incumbent (wâjib) or not. And the Khârijites say that it is not incumbent at all. And the Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites say that it is incumbent upon man, but then they disagree. The Ash'arites say that this is known by tradition, and the Mu'tazilites say (it is known) by reason. And our companions the Imâmites say that it is incumbent upon Allâh the Most High by reason, and this is the reality. And the proof of its reality is that the Imâmate is a kindness (luṭf), and every sort of kindness is incumbent upon Allâh the Most High. Hence the Imâmate is incumbent upon Allâh the Most High. The major premise we have already explained. And the minor premise is that kindness (luṭf) such as that which thou hast known (from our previous explanation) is that which brings the creature near to obedience and keeps him far from disobedience, and this idea (ma'nâ) is realized by the Imâmate. And in explanation of this, (we say that) whoever has known dark experiences and has examined political principles knows of necessity that whenever men have among them a chief and a guide whom they obey, who restrains the oppressor from his oppression and the unjust man from his injustice and avenges the oppressed of his oppressor, and along with that leads them to rational principles and religious duties, and restrains them from the corruptions which cause the destruction of order in their worldly affairs, and from the evils which result in wretchedness in the world to come, so that every individual might fear that punishment, then because of this they will draw near to soundness and depart from corruption. And by *luṭf* we mean

nothing except this. Hence the Imâmate is *luṭf*, and that is what we sought.

177. And know that everything which proves (dâlla) that Prophecy is necessary proves also that the Imâmate is necessary. For the Imâmate is the successor (khilâfa) of Prophecy and stands in its place (qâ'im maqâmahâ), except in the matter of receiving (talaqqî) divine inspiration (waḥy) without a mediator. And in the same way in which Prophecy is incumbent upon Allâh the Most High on philosophical grounds, so also is the Imâmate.

178. And those who hold that it is incumbent upon man (khalq) say that it is incumbent upon them to appoint a ruler to guard their persons from harm, for guarding against harm is incumbent. And we say that we have no quarrel with them as to the Imâmate's being a protection from harm and as to its being incumbent. But our quarrel is about their saying that it has been bestowed (tafwîḍ) upon men, for in this case there would be an actual conflict (between Allâh and men) regarding the appointment of Imâms, and it would result in harm, whereas what is sought is the decrease of harm. And all this is also guarded against by the fact that immunity to sin is a necessary condition (in the Imâm), and that his appointment (naṣṣ) by the Prophet is necessary.

179. (2) SECOND, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE IMÂM BE IMMUNE TO SIN (ma'ṣûm), OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE AN ENDLESS CHAIN. FOR THE NEED WHICH DEMANDS THE IMÂM IS THE RESTRAINING OF THE OPPRESSOR FROM HIS OPPRESSION AND THE AVENGING OF THE OPPRESSED OF HIS OPPRESSOR. NOW IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE NOT IMMUNE TO SIN THEN HE WOULD NEED ANOTHER IMÂM, AND THERE WOULD BE AN ENDLESS CHAIN, AND THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE. AND ALSO BECAUSE IF HE COMMITTED SIN (ma'ṣiya), AND IF IT WERE INCUMBENT UPON MEN TO DISAPPROVE OF HIM, HE WOULD LOSE HIS PLACE IN MEN'S HEARTS, AND THE VALUE OF HIS APPOINTMENT WOULD BE NULLIFIED. AND IF IT WERE NOT NECESSARY (that he be immune to sin), THE COMMAND TO DO WHAT IS APPROVED BY ALLÂH (al-ma'rûf) AND THE PRO-

HIBITION AGAINST WHAT IS DISAPPROVED (al-munkar) WOULD CEASE TO BE INCUMBENT, AND THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE. AND ALSO BECAUSE HE IS THE GUARDIAN OF THE LAW, IN WHICH CASE HE MUST BE IMMUNE TO SIN IN ORDER THAT IT BE SAFE FROM ADDITION OR LOSS. AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WORD OF THE MOST HIGH, "MY COVENANT EMBRACETH NOT THE EVILDOERS" (2: 118).

180. When he had proved that the Imâmate is necessary he began to explain the qualities which constitute the necessary condition for the validity of the Imâmate. And among them is immunity to sin, the meaning of which thou hast come to know. Now there is a difference of opinion as to its being a necessary condition in the Imâm. Our companions the Twelvers and the Ismâ'ilites have considered it a necessary condition, as opposed to the other sects (firaq). And the author sought to establish the belief (madhhab) of our companions by several proofs:

181. (1) First, if the Imâm were not immune to sin, then it would be necessary for the number of Imâms to be without limit. And that which is necessitated is false, hence that which necessitates it is false also. And in explanation of this necessity—we have already explained the cause which makes us need an Imâm, that is, the restraining of the oppressor from his oppression, and the avenging of the oppressed of his oppressor, and the leading of the people to that in which their soundness (ṣalâḥ) consists and turning them away from that which results in their corruption. Then if he were not immune to sin there would be need of another Imâm who would restrain him from his error (khaṭâ). And we transfer the discussion to that other Imâm. Then it would be necessary for the number of Imâms to be without limit, and that is false.

182. (2) If he were not immune to sin, then sin would be possible (jâ'iz) for him. Let us suppose that he committed sin. Then in this case there would have to follow either the loss of the value of his appointment, or the nullifying (suqûṭ) of his command to do what is approved and his prohibition of what is disapproved. And that which is necessitated is false in both its parts. Hence that which necessitates it is false

also. And in explanation of the necessity (we say that) whenever he commits sin it is either (*a*) incumbent upon men to disapprove of him, or (*b*) it is not. From the first alternative (*a*) it would necessarily follow that he would lose his place in men's hearts, and that after being a commander (âmir) he would have to become obedient to commands (ma'mûr), and after being a prohibitor he would have to heed the prohibitions (of others). And in such a case the value sought for in his appointment, namely, the elevation of his place in men's hearts and their obedience to his commands and prohibitions, would be lost. And from the second alternative (*b*) it would necessarily follow that his command to do what is approved and his prohibition of what is disapproved would become non-incumbent, and that is false by the agreement of all.

183. (3) Third, he is the guardian of the law, and it is incumbent that everyone who is such be immune to sin. (*a*) First, because the guardian of the law might be either the Book (the Koran), or *mutawâtir* tradition (that which has come down in a number of independent unbroken lines), or agreement (al-ijmâ'), or fundamental absolution (al-barâ'atu'l-aṣliyya—*e.g.*, when a Muslim is in doubt as to whether Ramaḍân is over or not he can pass judgment in his own mind that it is over and proceed to break the fast), or reasoning (qiyâs), or tradition that has come down in a single line (khabaru'l-wâḥid), or *istiṣḥâb* (when one is in doubt as to whether something that was clean has become unclean or not, he has the right to say, "I decree (ḥukm) that this is clean"—this is *istiṣḥâb*). And no one of these is proper (ṣâliḥ) for guarding the law. The Book and tradition are not, because they do not contain (wâfî) all the commandments (aḥkâm), although in every situation Allâh has a command which it is incumbent to know (taḥṣîl). And agreement (ijmâ') is not, for two reasons: first, it is unable to meet most situations, although Allâh has a command for (each of) them; and second, on the supposition of the non-existence of one immune to sin, there is in agreement no convincing proof (ḥujja). Hence agreement is unprofitable, because of the possibility of error in every individual of them, and so in all of them. And Allâh the Most

High points to the possibility of error in all of them in His word, "If he die, therefore, or be slain, will ye turn upon your heels?" (3:138). And the Prophet said, "Beware lest after me you refer your affairs to unbelievers" (namely, Abû Bakr, etc.). And this address is not directed to any except those to whom error is absolutely possible. (That is, in case there is no Imâm who is *ma'ṣûm*, it is possible for the agreement of believers to result in error.) For man is not forbidden to fly to the sky, because it is absolutely impossible for him to do so.

184. And fundamental absolution is not able to guard the law, because it requires the removal (irtifâ') of most of the commandments of the law. And it may be said that what is fundamental (al-aṣl) is the absolution of man from the obligation (dhimma) of what is incumbent and forbidden. And the three remaining (namely, *qiyâs, khabaru'l-wâhid, and istiṣḥâb*) all are alike in placing importance upon supposition (az-ẓann), and supposition especially gives no satisfactory knowledge of reality. And the proof for the rejection of *qiyâs* is established, because our law is built upon the difference in things that agree (muttafiqât), such as the incumbence of fasting on the last day of the month of Ramaḍân and its being forbidden on the first of (the following month) Shawwâl, and the agreement in things that differ, such as the obligation to make ablution from both urine and stools, and the agreement of both accidental murder and *ẓihâr* in requiring atonement (kaffâra). (*Ẓihâr* is when a man says to his wife, "you are as my mother to me." He then has to make atonement before she becomes lawful to him again.) Not only so, but the Lawgiver cut off the hand of the petty thief but not of one who stole large sums (ghâṣib), and he scourged men for accusing people falsely of adultery and made four female witnesses necessary for it, but not for blasphemy (kufr). And all of this precludes *qiyâs*. And the Prophet of Allâh has said, "After me this people will act some by the Book and some by tradition and some by *qiyâs*, and whenever they do thus then they have gone astray, and have led astray (others), and nothing remains to be the guardian of the law except the Imâm." And that is what we sought. And the Most High

Creator has indicated this by His word, "But if they would report them to the Messenger, and to those who are in authority among them (that is, the Imâms), those who desire information would learn it from them" (4: 85).[a] (b) Second, since he is the guardian of the law (he must be immune to sin), for if he were not immune to sin there would be no security against addition and loss and change and interchange in the law.

(4) Fourth, everyone who is not immune to sin is unjust (ẓâlim), and nothing unjust is proper for the Imâmate. Hence no one who is not immune to sin is fit for the Imâmate. And the minor premise is true because an unjust person is one who places anything in a situation other than its own, and one who is not immune to sin is thus. And the major premise is true because of the word of the Most High, "My covenant embraceth not the evildoers" (2: 118). And the meaning of "covenant" is the covenant of the Imâmate, for the verse points to that.

186. (3) THIRD, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE IMÂM BE SPECIFIED (manṣûṣ) FOR (the Imâmate), BECAUSE IMMUNITY TO SIN IS A MATTER OF THE HEART WHICH NO ONE PERCEIVES BUT ALLÂH THE MOST HIGH. HENCE THE SPECIFICATION MUST BE MADE BY ONE WHO KNOWS THAT THE IMÂM HAS THE IMMUNITY TO SIN (necessary) FOR IT, OR SOME MIRACLE (mu'jiza) MUST BE WROUGHT BY HIS HAND TO PROVE HIS VERACITY. (That is, the Imâm must be appointed by Allâh, not by the people.)

187. This is a reference to the way of appointing the Imâm. And agreement has been reached that in appointing the Imâm the specification can be made by Allâh and His Prophet, or by a previous Imâm in an independent way (without the voice of the people). And verily the disagreement is as to whether or not his appointment (ta'yîn) can be in a way (sabab) that is other than specification (naṣṣ) (by Allâh and the Prophet). And our companions the Imâmites deny that absolutely, and say that there is no way except *naṣṣ*. For we have explained that immunity to sin is a necessary condition of the Imâmate. And immunity to sin is a hidden

matter, and no one is informed of it except Allâh. Hence in such a case no one can know in whom it is (to be found), unless He who knows the unseen (al-ghayb) make it known. And that comes about in two ways: (1) first, by making it known to someone immune to sin, such as the Prophet, and then he tells us of the Imâm's immunity to sin and of his appointment (ta'yîn); (2) second, by the appearance of miracles wrought by his hand to prove his veracity in claiming the Imâmate.

188. And the Sunnites say that whenever the people (umma) acknowledge any person as chief (bâya'at), and are convinced of his ability (isti'dâd) for it (the Imâmate), and his power increases in the regions (khiṭaṭ) of Islâm, he becomes the Imâm. And the Zaydites say that any rational ascetic Fâṭimite who comes forth with the sword and claims the Imâmate is the Imâm. And the reality is contrary to all of this, for two reasons: first, the Imâmate is a succession (khilâfa) from Allâh and His Messenger, and it cannot be acquired except by the word of them both; and second, the establishing of the Imâmate by acknowledging anyone as chief and by his claim to it would result in conflict (fitna), because of the probability that every party would acknowledge some different person as Imâm, or that every rational Fâṭimite would claim the Imâmate, and then fightings and struggles would result.

189. (4) FOURTH, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE IMÂM BE ABSOLUTELY THE BEST (afḍal) OF THE PEOPLE, BECAUSE OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE REGARDING THE PROPHET.

190. It is necessary (wâjib) that the Imâm be the best of the people of his age, because he takes precedence over (muqaddam) all. And if there were among them one better than he then the worse (mafḍûl) would have to take precedence over the better, and that would be evil (qabîḥ) according to reason and tradition. And this has been already explained in (the section on) Prophecy (par. 170).

191. (5) FIFTH, THE IMÂM AFTER THE MESSENGER OF ALLÂH IS 'ALÎ B. ABÎ ṬÂLIB, (1) BECAUSE OF HIS SPECIFICATION (naṣṣ)

WHICH HAS COME DOWN IN SEVERAL SEPARATE LINES (mutawâtir) FROM THE PROPHET. AND (2) BECAUSE HE IS THE BEST OF THE PEOPLE OF HIS AGE, BY THE WORD OF THE MOST HIGH, "OURSELVES AND YOURSELVES" (3: 54). AND THE EQUAL OF THE BEST IS THE BEST; AND BECAUSE OF THE PROPHET'S NEED OF HIM IN THE "CURSING OF ONE ANOTHER" (mubâhala). AND (3) BECAUSE IT IS NECESSARY (wâjib) FOR THE IMÂM TO BE IMMUNE TO SIN, AND THERE IS NO ONE ELSE BESIDE HIM OF THOSE WHO CLAIM THE IMÂMATE WHO IS IMMUNE TO SIN, BY THE AGREEMENT OF ALL. HENCE HE IS THE IMÂM. AND (4) BECAUSE HE IS THE MOST KNOWING (a'lam), FOR THE COMPANIONS CONSULTED HIM ABOUT THEIR PROBLEMS, AND HE DID NOT CONSULT ANY ONE OF THEM; AND BECAUSE OF THE WORD OF THE PROPHET (UPON HIM AND HIS DESCENDANTS BE PEACE!), "'ALÎ IS THE BEST OF YOUR JUDGES (aqḍâ)," AND JUDGMENT REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE, AND (5) BECAUSE HE IS MORE ASCETIC THAN ANY ONE ELSE, SO THAT HE DIVORCED THE WORLD THREE TIMES.

192. When he finished the conditions of the Imâmate he began on the appointment of the Imâm. And men have differed regarding that. And some say that the Imâm after the Messenger of Allâh was al-'Abbâs b. 'Abdu'l-Muṭṭalib, because he was his heir. And the multitude of Muslims say that he was Abû Bakr b. Abû Quḥâfa, because the people chose him. And the Shî'ites say that he was 'Alî b. Abî Ṭâlib because of the appointment (naṣṣ) which came down direct to him (mutawâtir) from Allâh and His Messenger, and that is the reality. And the author has proved 'Alî's right in several ways: (1) First, that consecutive tradition from the word of the Prophet which the Shî'ites quote regarding the right of 'Alî, by which certain knowledge can be obtained, namely, "Greet him as the chief of the believers" (bi-imrati'l-mu'minîn), and, "Thou art the successor (khalîfa) after me," and other such words which prove what we sought. Hence he is the Imâm, and that is what we sought.

193. (2) Second, he is the best of men after the Messenger of God.[a] Then he is the Imâm, because it would be evil for the worse to take precedence over the better. And he is

the best for two reasons: (*a*) first, he is equal to the Prophet. And the prophet is the best (afḍal), hence his equal is also the best, otherwise he would not be equal to him. And he is his equal because of the word of the Most High, in the verse of "cursing one another" (3 : 54), "and ourselves and yourselves."[b] And the intention (murâd) in "ourselves" is 'Alî b. Abî. Ṭâlib, as is proved by sound tradition. And without doubt the intention is not that his self (nafs) is 'Alî's self, because union (ittiḥâd) is false. Hence his intention is "like him" and "equal to him," as it is said, "Zayd is as a lion," that is, is like him in bravery. And since he is equal to him he is the best, and that was what we sought.

194. (*b*) Second, in the "cursing one another" (incident) the Prophet had need of him, and of no one else of the companions and kindred, in his prayer. And he who was needed is better than anyone else, especially in those great events (that is, the debate with the Christians of Najrân) which are among the bases and foundations of (the validity of his) Prophecy.

195. (3) Third, it is necessary for the Imâm to be immune to sin. And no one for whom the Imâmate is claimed is immune to sin except 'Alî. Hence no one but him is Imâm. Now the minor premise has already been explained. And the major premise is true, because all are agreed that 'Abbâs and Abû Bakr were not immune to sin. Hence it comes about that he is the Imâm. Otherwise agreement would have to be nullified if we established immunity from sin for anyone except him, or else the age would have to be quit of any Imâm who was immune to sin, and both (alternatives) are false.

196. (4) Fourth, he is the most knowing of men after the Messenger of Allâh, hence he is the Imâm. Now he is the most knowing for several reasons: (*a*) first, he was mighty (shadîd) in surmise (ḥads) and sagacity (dhakâ) and in desire (ḥirṣ) for learning, and he was the constant companion of the Prophet, who was absolutely perfect after Allâh the Most High, and had a mighty love for him and a desire to teach him. And whenever these qualities are united in a person

it is necessary (wâjib) that he be more knowing than anyone else besides that teacher, and that is self-evident.

197. (*b*) Second, the greatest of the doctors among the Companions and the Successors (tâbi'în) used to consult him about the problems which they met and to take his word, and to refer to him contrary to their own opinions (ijtihâd), and this is explained in the books of history and biography.

198. (*c*) Third, all the masters of the arts (funûn) and sciences ('ulûm) refer to him. For the commentators take the word of Ibn 'Abbâs, and he was one of 'Alî's disciples, as he said, "'Alî explained for me the *bâ* in *bismillâh* from the beginning to the end of the night." And the masters of scholastic theology go to him—the Mu'tazilites, in that they refer to Abû 'Alî al-Jubbâ'î, and he in matters of knowledge refers to Abû Hâshim b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya, and he refers to his father 'Alî; and the Ash'arites, because they refer to Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arî, and he was the disciple of Abû 'Alî al-Jubbâ'î; and the Imâmites, whose reference to 'Alî is evident. And if there were nothing else except his word (kalâm) in "Nahju'l-Balâgha" and other books in which are recorded discussions of divinity, the Unity and Justice and Destiny (qaḍâ) and Decree (qadar), and the manner of progress on the way to Allâh (sulûk) and the degrees of real knowledge, and the principles of oratory and the rules of eloquence and other sciences, there would be in it enough to satisfy one who considers and to warn one who thinks. As for the masters of jurisprudence, the reference of the chief of the *mujtahids* of the various sects to the disciples of 'Alî is well known. And his wonderful decisions in jurisprudence are mentioned in their own place, such as his decision in the affair of the man who had sworn that he would not loose the chain of his slave that (the other man) might give its weight in silver.

[A certain man saw a slave with a chain on his feet, and vowed to give the weight of the chain in silver to the poor if the owner would loose him. The owner refused to take off the chain, and the man did not know how to ascertain the weight of it so that he could pay his vow. 'Alî told

> him to put the slave's feet in a basin of water, then lift the chains up out of the water, and put in enough silver to make the water rise to where it was before.]

Also his decision in the matter of the owner of the loaves of bread (who did not know how to divide them equitably), and so forth.

199. (*d*) Fourth, the word of the Prophet regarding him, "'Alî is the best judge of you all." Now it is well known that judgment (qaḍâ) has need of many sciences. Hence Alî is master of them all.

200. (*e*) Fifth, the word of 'Alî, "If a cushion be placed for me and I sit upon it, then I will judge (ḥukm) among the people of the Tawrât according to their Tawrât, and among the people of the Furqân according to their Furqân, and among the people of the Injîl according to their Injîl, and among the people of the Zabûr according to their Zabûr. By Allâh, there is no verse that has descended by night or by day, in the plain or on the mountain, without my knowing upon whom it has descended and regarding what it has descended." And this proves his mastery (ihâṭa) of all the divine sciences. And since he is the most knowing he is therefore the one appointed for the Imâmate, and that is what was sought.

201. (5) He is the most ascetic of men after the Prophet of Allâh. Hence it comes about that he is the Imâm, for the most ascetic is the best. And as for his being the most ascetic, we must examine his words (kalâm) regarding asceticism (zuhd), and his sermons and commands and prohibitions, and his shunning the world, the evidences of which are manifest in him (not in word but in deed), so that he divorced the world three times.

> [The world came to him in the form of a beautiful maiden, and he pronounced the triple formula of divorce, thereby making her unlawful for him.]

And he shunned worldly pleasures of food and drink and raiment, and he was not known by anyone to be entangled in anything worldly. He even used to lock up his vessel of bread, and when they asked him about that, he said, "I

fear lest one of my children should put in it some buttered bread." And the fact that he distributed his own food and his family's food to the poor and the orphans and the prisoners is a sufficient proof of his asceticism. And a verse of the Koran descended regarding that, proving his excellence and his immunity to sin.

202. AND THE PROOFS OF THIS CANNOT BE NUMBERED FOR MULTITUDE.

203. The proofs of the Imâmate of 'Alî are more than can be numbered, so that the author composed a book on the Imâmate and named it "Kitâbu'l-Alfayn" and mentioned in it two thousand proofs for his Imâmate. And a multitude of the doctors have composed so many treatises on this subject (fann) that it is impossible to encompass them, but we will mention here some of them to exalt and bless him by remembering his excellences. And they are of several sorts: (1) First, the word of the Most High, "Verily your protector (walî) is Allâh and His Messenger, and those who believe, who observe prayer, and pay the alms of obligation, and who bow in worship" (5:60). And (the understanding of that) depends on several preliminaries (muqaddamât). (*a*) First, the lexicographers say that "Verily" (innamâ) is to restrict (ḥaṣr) the meaning. The poet said, "I am a protector, a helper, a brave man; *verily* either I or one like me will defend their relatives." And if this *verily* did not restrict the meaning, then his boast would not be fulfilled. (*b*) Second, by *walî* the intention is either *the worthiest to control* (al-awlâ bi't-taṣarruf) or *the helper* (an-nâṣir), since in this place absolutely no other of the meanings (of *walî*) is sound. But the second meaning (namely, *the helper*) is here false, because help does not belong exclusively to those two (Allâh and His Messenger). Hence the first (meaning) is singled out. (*c*) Third, the address is to believers, for what immediately precedes is, "O ye who believe, should any of you desert his religion" (5:59). Then He says, "Verily your *walî* is Allâh and His Messenger." Hence the pronoun (*your*) applies in truth to them (believers). (*d*) Fourth, the intention by "O ye who believe" in the verse

is *some* of the believers, for two reasons: first, if it were not thus, then every individual believer would become *walî* in his own person in the meaning mentioned (see (*a*)), and that is false; and second, the description which he gave of them does not apply to all of them, that is, the giving of alms while in the state of bowing in worship (rukû'), since the phrase expresses a state of being (ḥâliyya). (*e*) Fifth, the intention by this *some* is 'Alî b. Abî Ṭâlib exclusively, because of sound tradition and the agreement of most of the commentators that while he was praying a beggar begged him for something, and he gave him his signet ring while he was bowed in worship. And since 'Alî is the worthiest to control among us, he is singled out to be the Imâm. For by Imâm we do not mean anything except this.

204. (2) Second, a *mutawâtir* tradition has been handed down that when the Prophet returned from the farewell pilgrimage to Mecca he commanded them to alight at the Pool (ghadîr) of Khum at noon. And the loads (of the camels) were placed for him in the form of a pulpit. And he addressed the people and called for 'Alî and lifted him up with his hand and said, "O people, am I not better (awlâ) for you than your own souls?" They said, "Yea, O Prophet of Allâh!" He said, "Let whoever owns me as his master (mawlâ) own this 'Alî as his master. O Allâh, befriend (wâli) whoever befriends him and hate whoever hates him, and help whoever helps 'Alî and forsake whoever forsakes him, and compass him with reality as he goes about!" And he repeated that to them three times. And the intention in *mawlâ* is *awlâ* (the better), because the first of the narrative, "Am I not better for you (awlâ bikum)?" indicates that. And in the word of the Most High regarding the unbelievers (57: 14), "Your abode the fire!—This shall be your master (mawlâkum)," the meaning is, "it is better for you (awlâ bikum)." And also it is not possible here for *mawlâ* to have any other meaning, such as neighbour (al-jâr) or releaser of a slave (mu'tiq) or ally (ḥalîf) or nephew, for it is impossible that the Prophet should stand in that time of excessive heat and call the people and inform them of things which did not have

any great value for them, such as that whoever was his neighbour or the releaser of his slave, etc., was 'Alî's likewise. And since 'Alî is the best (awlâ) among us he is the Imâm.

205. (3) Third, a *mutawâtir* tradition (naṣṣ) has come down to us that the Prophet said to 'Alî, "Thou hast (received) the same position from me which Hârûn had from Mûsâ, except that there is no prophet after me." He confirms for him, therefore, all the degrees (marâtib) which Hârûn had from Mûsâ, and he excepts prophecy. Now one of the positions which Hârûn received from Mûsâ was that of being his successor (khalîfa), although he died before him. And 'Alî lived after the Messenger of Allâh. Hence his succession is established, since there is nothing to cause his displacement (zawâl).

206. (4) Fourth, the word of the Most High, "O ye who believe! obey Allâh and obey the Messenger, and those among you invested with authority" (4: 62). And by "those invested with authority" the intention is either one who is known to be immune to sin, or it is not. The second alternative is false by agreement, because it is impossible that Allâh should command absolute obedience to one to whom error is possible. Hence the first is singled out. Hence it comes about that he is 'Alî b. Abî Ṭâlib (upon him be peace!), since immunity to sin was not claimed for anyone except him and his descendants. Hence they are the ones intended, and that is what was sought. And this deduction is contained exactly in the word of the Most High, "Believers! fear Allâh and be with the sincere (as-ṣâdiqîn)" (9: 120).

207. (5) Fifth, he claimed the Imâmate, and miracles were wrought by his hand, and whoever is like that is veracious in his claim. Now that he claimed the Imâmate is evident, and the records of his words and complaints and quarrels are well known from the books of biography and history, so that when he saw that they had deserted him he sat down in his house and busied himself with collecting the Book of the Lord (the Koran). And when they sought him to acknowledge him as their chief he refused. Then they kindled a fire in his house and forced him to go out. And his sermon entitled *Shiqshiqiyya* in "Nahju'l-Balâgha" will suffice to

make thee aware of his complaint in this matter. And the miracles wrought by his hand were many. Among them are the removing of the gate of Khaybar,[a] and conversing with ravenous beasts on the pulpit of Kûfa, and the lifting up of a great stone from the mouth of the well when the army could not remove it, and making the sun to go back so that it returned to its place in the heavens, and others which cannot be numbered. And every one who is like that is veracious (ṣâdiq). Hence he is veracious, because of what has been previously said regarding Prophecy.

208. (6) Sixth, either the Prophet appointed (naṣṣ) an Imâm, or he did not. The second alternative is false, for two reasons: (*a*) First, the appointment of an Imâm is incumbent upon him, to perfect religion and to appoint its guardian. And if the Messenger of Allâh had failed to do that he would have failed in doing what was incumbent (wâjib). (*b*) Second, since his (Muḥammad's) compassion and lovingkindness for the *mukallafîn* and his care for their advantage was so great that he taught them the places of purification (istinjâ) and impurity (janâba) and other things which are of far less importance than the Imâmate, it is impossible that in his wisdom and immunity to sin he should not specify for them him whom they should consult in their problems and in their private affairs and in their needs. Hence the first (alternative—that he appointed an Imâm) is singled out (as true). And the mass of the people did not claim that anyone had been appointed except 'Alî and Abû Bakr. Hence it follows that the one appointed was either 'Alî or Abû Bakr. And the second alternative is false, hence the first is singled out.

209. Now the second (alternative) is false for several reasons: (*a*) First, if Abû Bakr was the one appointed, then the dependence of his authority on the acknowledgment (bay'a) of the people was sin and an impugning of the Imâmate. (*b*) Second, if he was the one appointed, then he would have mentioned that, and would have claimed it at the time when the people acknowledged him, or after it, or before it, since "there is no '*iṭr* (attar) after 'Arûs is dead" (said by a

wife when her husband 'Arûs died). But he did not claim it, hence he was not the one appointed. (*c*) Third, if he was the one appointed then his asking to be excused from the succession, when he said, "Excuse me, I am not the best of you when 'Alî is among you," was a great sin, for it would have been a rejection of Allâh and His Messenger. Hence it would have impugned his Imâmate. (*d*) Fourth, if he had been the one appointed he would not have been in doubt at his death as to his worthiness of the succession. But he was in doubt, so that he said, "O that I had asked the Messenger whether in this matter the right was with the Anṣârs or not!" (*e*) Fifth, if he was the one appointed, the Messenger of Allâh would not have commanded him to go out with the army of Usâma b. Zayd. For the Messenger of Allâh was ill, and his soul had warned him of death, so that he said, "My soul warns me of my death, and I am about to be taken, because Jibrâ'îl used to present himself to me with the Koran once every year, and this year he presented himself to me with it twice." And if this were the situation and the Imâm were Abû Bakr, then he would not have commanded him not to remain behind Usâma. But he urged all to go out, and he cursed all who should stay behind him, and he found fault with them when they remained behind them. (*f*) Sixth, if there is no one except 'Alî among those for whom the Imâmate is claimed who is fit for it, then he is singled out for it. And the first statement is true because they were all unjust (ẓâlim) because of their previous unbelief, according to the word of the Most High, "My covenant embraceth not evil doers" (2: 118).

210. THEN AFTER HIM HIS SON AL-ḤASAN, THEN AL-ḤUSAYN, THEN 'ALÎ B. AL-ḤUSAYN, THEN MUḤAMMAD B. 'ALÎ AL-BÂQIR, THEN JA'FAR B. MUḤAMMAD AS-ṢÂDIQ, THEN MÛSÂ B. JA'FAR AL-KÂẒIM, THEN 'ALÎ B. MÛSÂ AR-RIḌÂ, THEN MUḤAMMAD B. 'ALÎ AL-JAWÂD, THEN 'ALÎ B. MUḤAMMAD AL-HÂDÎ, THEN AL-ḤASAN B. 'ALÎ AL-'ASKARÎ, THEN MUḤAMAD B. AL-ḤASAN THE LORD OF THE AGE (ṢÂḤIBU'Z-ZAMÂN)—THE BLESSING OF ALLÂH BE UPON THEM! BECAUSE EACH ONE OF THEM WHO PRECEDED APPOINTED HIS SUCCESSOR, AND BECAUSE OF THE PRECEDING PROOFS.

211. When he had finished establishing the Imâmate of 'Alî he began to establish the Imâmate of the Imâms who were steadfast in authority after him. And the proof of that is of several kinds: (1) First, the appointment (naṣṣ) of the Prophet (Allâh bless him, etc.). And concerning this is his word to Ḥusayn, " This is my son Ḥusayn, an Imâm, the son of an Imâm, the brother of an Imâm, the father of nine Imâms, the ninth of them being the one of them who shall arise (al-qâ'im) and the greatest (afḍal) of them." And again (there is) that which Jâbir b. 'Abdu'llâh the Anṣârî related. He said, " When the word of the Most High descended, ' O ye who believe ! obey Allâh and obey the Messenger and those among you invested with authority ' (4: 62), I said, ' O Messenger of Allâh, we know Allâh and obey Him, and we know thee and obey thee, but who are *those invested with authority* whom Allâh has commanded us to obey ?' He said, ' O Jâbir, they are my successors and the possessors of authority after me. The first of them is 'Alî, then after him is his son al-Ḥasan, then al-Ḥusayn, then 'Alî b. al-Ḥusayn, then Muḥammad b. 'Alî (and you will soon see him, O Jâbir, and when you see him then give him my greetings), then Ja'far b. Muḥammad, then Mûsâ b. Ja'far, then 'Alî b. Mûsâ ar-Riḍâ, then Muḥammad b. 'Alî af-Jawâd, then 'Alî b. Muḥammad, then al-Ḥasan b. 'Alî, then Muḥammad b. al-Hasan (he will fill the earth with equity and justice just as it is (now) full of injustice and oppression) '."

212. And again (there is) that which has been related from the Prophet, that he said that Allâh chose Friday from among the days, and the month Ramaḍân from among the months, and the night of *qadr* from among the nights. And He chose the prophets from among mankind, and He chose the Messengers from among the prophets, and He chose me from among the messengers, and He chose 'Alî from me, and He chose al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn from 'Alî, and He chose from al-Ḥusayn his executors (awṣiyâ), who are nine of his descendants, who should prevent the erring from leading others astray from their religion, and the destroyers from making their profession, and the ignorant from interpreting.

213. (2) Second, the appointment by each one of them of his successor, which has come to us by *mutawâtir* traditions, which are too many to be numbered. And the Imâmites have related traditions regarding their succession (ṭabaqât) which are contradictory.

214. (3) Third, it is necessary that the Imâm be immune to sin, and there is no one besides them who is immune to sin. Hence no one besides them is an Imâm. The explanation of the first statement has been already given. And the second statement is true by agreement that in the time of each one of them immunity to sin was not claimed for anyone except them. Hence they are the Imâms.

215. (4) Fourth, they are better than anyone else of the people of their time, as is known from the books of biography and history. Hence they are the Imâms, because it would be evil for the worse to take precedence over the better.

216. (5) Fifth, each one of them claimed the Imâmate, and miracles were wrought by his hand. Hence he is the Imâm. And the explanation of this has preceded, and the Imâmites have related their miracles in their books. And there is a book for thee regarding this, "Kharâ'iju'l-Jarâ'iḥ (?)" of ar-Râwandî, and other books also on this same subject.

217. A matter of importance—the Twelfth Imâm is alive and existent (mawjûd) from the time of his birth (256 A.H.), to the end of the period of *taklîf*. For in every age there must be an Imâm immune to sin, because the proofs are universal ('umûm), and beside him there is no one immune to sin. Hence he is the Imâm. And the thought that it is unlikely that anyone like him should remain alive is false, for it is possible, especially since it has occurred in previous times to the fortunate (as-su'adâ) and the unfortunate (al-ashqiyâ) (the saved and the lost) to live longer than he has lived. And the cause of his being hidden is either some advantage which Allâh has kept to Himself, or else the number of enemies and the paucity of helpers. For in view of the wisdom of the Most High and the Imâm's immunity to sin it is impossible that Allâh's kindness (luṭf) be hindered. Hence it is because of

someone else (that is, the enmity of men), and that is what was sought.

218. O Allâh, hasten his joy, and cause us to behold his victory, and make us his helpers and his followers, and sustain us with his obedience and his good pleasure, and protect us from his opposition and his anger, by the Real (al-ḥaqq) and by him who speaks in verity (the Prophet or Imâm)!

SECTION VII

219. *Concerning the Return* (*al-ma'âd*). THE MUSLIMS ARE AGREED AS TO THE NECESSITY OF THE PHYSICAL (badanî) RETURN, BECAUSE IF THERE WERE NO RETURN *taklîf* WOULD BE EVIL, AND BECAUSE IT IS A POSSIBLE THING, AND THE VERACIOUS (the Prophet) HAS INFORMED US THAT IT IS ASSURED —HENCE IT IS REAL—AND BECAUSE OF THE VERSES WHICH TEACH IT AND WHICH DENY HIM WHO CONTRADICTS IT.

220. *Ma'âd* is the time of return, or its place. But what is intended here is the new existence (al-wujûdu'th-thânî) for bodies (ajsâd) and their return after their death and decomposition. And it is real and comes to pass, contrary to the philosophers (ḥukamâ). And the proof of that is of several kinds: (1) First, the agreement of Muslims regarding it, without any denial of it among them. And their agreement is a convincing proof (ḥujja). (2) Second, if the *ma'âd* were not real then *taklîf* would be evil. And the consequence is false, hence the precedent is false also. And in explanation of the conditional statement—*taklîf* is labour which requires a compensation. Hence labour without recompense would be injustice. But recompense cannot be acquired in the period of *taklîf*. Hence in this case there must be another abode in which the reward for good actions can be acquired, otherwise *taklîf* would be injustice, and that would be evil—and Allâh is exalted above that!

221. (3) Third, the assembling of bodies is possible, and the Veracious informed us of its occurrence, hence it is real. And it is possible, for the members of a corpse have the capacity of being united and of having life bestowed upon them, otherwise they could not have previously possessed the quality of life. Allâh the Most High knows the members of every person, because of what has been previously said as to His knowing all knowable things and His having power to unite them. For that is possible (existence), and Allâh the

Most High has power over all possible existences. Hence it is established that the making alive of bodies is possible. And the Veracious informed us of its occurrence, for it is established by *mutawâtir* tradition that the Prophet used to prove the physical *ma'âd* and to believe in it. Hence it is real, and that is what was sought. (4) Fourth, the teaching of the Koran that it is established and its denial of one who contradicts it. Hence it is real. And the first proposition is true, for the verses which teach it are many. For instance, the word of the Most High, "And he meeteth us with arguments, and forgetteth his creation: 'Who,' saith he, 'shall give life to bones when they are rotten?' Say: 'He shall give life to them who gave them being at first, for in all creation is he skilled'" (36:78, 79), and other verses.

222. AND THE RESURRECTION (ba'th) OF EVERY ONE TO WHOM A RECOMPENSE MUST BE GIVEN OR WHO MUST GIVE A RECOMPENSE IS NECESSARY (wâjib) BY REASON, AND THE RETURN OF EVERY OTHER IS NECESSARY BY TRADITION.

223. Those whose return is necessary are of two classes, the return of the first of them is necessary by reason and tradition, and everyone who has a right (ḥaqq) to reward or recompense will get his right, and everyone against whom anyone has a right of punishment or recompense will have to give it. And the second class are those who have no right to receive or to give, be they men or some other animals either domestic or wild. And their return is necessary by tradition, because the Koran and *mutawâtir* traditions teach it.

224. AND THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ALL THAT THE PROPHET TAUGHT IS NECESSARY, SUCH AS THE BRIDGE (Ṣirâṭ) AND THE SCALES (Mîzân) AND THE SPEAKING OF THE MEMBERS (of the body) AND THE FLYING OF THE BOOKS. FOR THESE THINGS ARE POSSIBLE, AND THE VERACIOUS HAS INFORMED US OF THEM. HENCE THE CONFESSION (i'tirâf) OF THEM IS INCUMBENT.

225. Since the Prophetship and Immunity to sin of our Prophet are established, it is also established that he is

veracious in everything which he related, whether it be (1) previous to his age, as what he related of the previous prophets and their peoples and of former generations, and so forth; or (2) in his own age, as what he related of the incumbence of the things incumbent and the unlawfulness of things unlawful and the preference (nadb) of things preferable and the appointing of the Imâms, and other information; or (3) after his age, either (*a*) in the world of *taklîf*, as what he said to 'Alî, "After me thou shalt fight with the covenant-breakers (an-nâkithîn) and the wrongdoers (al-qâsiṭîn) and the heretics (al-mâriqîn)," or (*b*) after *taklîf*, such as the states of death and what is after it, namely, punishment and the grave and the Bridge and the Scales and rewards and the speaking of the members and the flying of the books and the states of the rising up (qiyâma) and the nature of the assembling of bodies and the states of the *mukallaf* in the resurrection. And it is incumbent to acknowledge and attest all that, because it is all possible and there is no impossibility about it. And the Veracious has informed us of its occurrence, hence it is real.

226. AND OTHER THINGS ARE REWARD (thawâb) AND PUNISHMENT ('iqâb). AND THE EXPLANATION OF THESE THINGS (that is, the extent of the reward and punishment) WHICH HAS BEEN HANDED DOWN IS FROM THE SIDE OF THE LAW (that is, not by reason)—MAY ALLÂH BLESS THE LAWGIVER!

227. He means that among the number of things which the Prophet taught are reward and punishment. And there has been a difference of opinion as to whether they are known by reason or tradition. The Ash'arites say that they are known by tradition. And some of the Mu'tazilites say that reward is known by tradition, because acts of obedience are not proportionate to their reward and are not sufficient to merit the great favours which he shows us, in view of which no one is worthy of reward. And that is the belief (madhhab) of al-Balkhî. And the Mu'tazilites of Baṣra say it is by reason, because *taklîf* demands it, and because of His word, "In recompense (jazâ) of their labours past" (56: 23). And the

Mu'tazilites hold that punishment is necessary (wâjib) irrevocably (ḥatman) for the unbeliever and the person guilty of a great sin. And our belief (madhhab) is that which has been stated above, which proves the necessity of reward by reason. And as for punishment, even though it includes kindness (luṭf—in preventing sinning), its occurrence in the case of one who is not an unbeliever who dies in his unbelief (namely, in the case of a believer who dies in great sin) is not fixed (that is, such a one shall not remain in hell).

228. And there are here several matters of importance: (1) First, one deserves reward and praise for doing what is incumbent (wâjib) and preferable (mandûb) and what is opposed to evil, and for forsaking evil, on the condition that he does what is incumbent because it is incumbent or because of the reward (wajh) of its being incumbent, and (that he does) what is preferable and what is opposed to evil, and forsakes evil, in the same way. And he deserves blame for doing evil and forsaking what is incumbent.

229. (2) Second, the continuance of merited reward and punishment is absolutely necessary in the case of one who dies in faith and of one who dies in unbelief, because of the continuance of praise and blame for what they deserve; and (because) the opposite of each of them comes into effect if it be not continuous (if there is not reward there must be punishment), since there is no middle ground between them, and they must of necessity be pure from the blending of the opposite, otherwise we will not understand them properly. And it is necessary that reward be accompanied by exaltation and punishment by contempt, for he who obeys is worthy of exaltation absolutely, and he who commits sin is worthy of contempt absolutely.

230. (3) Third, it is possible for the deserving of reward to depend upon a condition, since if it did not, then he who knew Allâh the Most High but did not know the Prophet would be worthy of reward, and that is false. Hence (reward) is conditioned upon fulfilment (muwâfât), according to the word of the Most High, "Verily, if thou join partners with Allâh, vain shall be all thy work" (39:65). And His word,

"And whoever of you shall turn from his religion and die an infidel, their works shall be fruitless in this world, and in the next: they shall be consigned to the fire" (2: 214).

231. (4) Fourth, "they who believe and who clothe not their faith with error" (6: 82), they are worthy of lasting reward absolutely; and "they who are infidels and die infidels" (2: 156), they are worthy of lasting punishment absolutely; and he who believed, "and with an action that is right . . . mixed with another that is wrong" (9: 103), if the wrong was a small sin then it is forgiven him, by the agreement of all, and if it was a great sin, then he either (*a*) repented, and then is absolutely of those who are rewarded, by the agreement of all; or (*b*) he did not repent of it, in which case he either deserves reward for his faith, or he does not; and the second alternative is false, because it would result in injustice, and because of the word of the Most High, "And whoever shall have wrought an atom's weight of good shall behold it" (99: 7). Hence the first is appointed (that is, he deserves reward). Then either (*a*) reward comes first, and afterwards he is punished, which is false by the agreement of all that whoever enters the Garden will not come out of it. Hence in this case (the doctrine of) punishment would have to be false; or (*b*) he is first punished, then rewarded, and that is what was sought. And (this is true) because of the word of the Prophet about those who came out of the fire (looking) like charcoal. And when the people of the Garden see them they will say, "These are the people of Hell." Then they will be commanded to wash themselves in the Spring of Life, and they will come out with their faces like the moon on the night when it is full.

232. And as for the verses which teach the punishment of the disobedient and the wicked and their abiding in the fire—now the intention in *abiding* (khulûd) is a *long stay*, and it is frequently used in this sense. And the intention in *wicked* and *disobedient* is those who are perfect (kâmil) in their wickedness and disobedience, and they are the unbelievers (al-kuffâr), by reason of the word of the Most High, "These are the Infidels, the Impure" (80: 42), thus reconciling this verse with the verses which teach that punishment belongs exclusively to

the unbelievers, as for instance the word of the Most High, "Verily, this day shall shame and evil fall upon the infidels" (16: 29), and other verses.

233. Then know that he who commits a great sin (al-kabîra) will verily be punished when (idhâ) he does not have one of two things: (2) First, the forgiveness of Allâh. For His forgiveness is hoped for and expected, especially because He has promised it in His word, "He forgiveth their sins" (42: 24), "and to pass over many things" (5: 18), "Verily Allâh will not forgive the union of other gods with Himself! But other than this He will forgive to whom He pleaseth" (4: 51). "Full truly of mercy is thy Lord unto men, despite their sins" (13: 7). And breaking a promise cannot be approved in the Absolutely Generous. And also because of His praising Himself as being "the Forgiving, the Merciful." And that does not apply to small sins (as-ṣaghîra), nor to great sins that have been repented of. For all have agreed that punishment falls from them (they are not punished), for in this case there would be no value in their forgiveness. Hence it is specified that it be the great sins preceding repentance (that is, unrepented of), and that is what was sought.

234. (*b*) Second, the intercession (shafâ'a) of our Prophet, the Messenger of Allâh (on him be peace!). And his intercession is expected, rather it has occurred, according to the word of the Most High, "Ask pardon for thy sin, and for believers both men and women" (47: 21). Now he who commits a great sin is (still) a believer, because of his attestation of Allâh and His Messenger and his confession (iqrâr) of what the Prophet brought, and that is faith (îmân). Because *îmân* as a word means attestation (taṣdîq), and here it is like that. And good works are not a part of it.[a] (And the Prophet will intercede for believers, for the term) is connected with the verb, which requires that it be different from it (that is, the word *believers* in the verse is connected with the verb *ask pardon* by the conjunction *and*, which shows that he is to ask pardon for believers as well as for himself). And since Allâh commanded the Prophet to seek pardon he did not disobey, for he is immune to sin, and his seeking pardon was

accepted for his people, that he might be satisfied, according to the word of the Most High, "And in the end shall thy Lord be bounteous to thee and thou shalt be satisfied" (93: 5). This is according to his (Muḥammad's) word, "I have stored up my intercession for those among my people who have committed great sins."

235. And know that our belief (madhhab) is that the Imâms can intercede for sinners among their Shî'ites just as the Messenger of Allâh can, without any difference. For they have informed us of that, and their immunity to sin prevents them from lying.

236. (5) Fifth, it is necessary to confess and attest the states and situations of the Resurrection, and the nature of the reckoning, and the coming of men from their graves, naked and barefoot, and the presence with every soul of a driver and a witness (two angels), and the states of men in the Garden, and the explanation of their ranks and the nature of their blessings of foods and drinks and marriages and so forth, of what eye hath not seen and ear hath not heard nor the heart of man conceived (cf. 1 Cor 2: 9). And likewise (it is necessary to attest) the states of the Fire and the nature of punishment in it, and the various pains in it, according to what the verses and sound traditions have taught, and about which the Muslims are agreed. For the Veracious has informed us of all that, and there is no rational difficulty in it, hence it is the reality, which is what we sought.

237. And repentance (at-tawba) is incumbent.

238. Repentance is contrition (nadam) for evil (al-qabîḥ) in the past, and forsaking it in the present, and the determination not to return to it in the future. And it is incumbent, because by agreement contrition for every evil and every remissness in what is incumbent is incumbent; and because tradition also teaches that it is incumbent; and also because it is a protection against harm, and protection from harm, even if it be supposed (maẓnûn), is incumbent. Then there must be contrition for evil because it is evil, not from fear of the Fire, and not to protect one's soul from harm, otherwise it is not repentance.

239. And know that sin (dhanb) is either against the Most High or against men. If it be against the Most High it is (*a*) either an evil act, in which case contrition and the determination not to repeat it are sufficient for it; or (*b*) it is remissness in what is incumbent. In the latter case there either remains time to purpose to do it, which is repentance for it; or else the time is past. In this case either the duty disappears with the passing of the time for it, like (omitting) the prayers of the Feast ('Îdu'l-Fiṭr—which cannot be said on another day), in which case contrition and the determination not to repeat (the offence) are sufficient; or it does not disappear, in which case it is incumbent to make it good (qaḍâ).

240. And if it is against men, it consists either of leading someone astray in religion by an erroneous decision (fatwâ), in which case repentance and guiding him aright and making known to him the error (are incumbent); or else of injustice regarding some right or other, in which case repentance for it, recompensing him or his heirs, or asking him to forgive it (are incumbent). And if he is not able to do that, then it is incumbent that he determine to do it.

241. AND COMMANDING (men to do) WHAT IS APPROVED BY ALLÂH (al-ma'rûf) AND PROHIBITING (them) FROM DOING WHAT IS DISAPPROVED BY HIM (al-munkar) (is incumbent), PROVIDED THAT HE WHO COMMANDS AND PROHIBITS KNOWS THAT WHAT IS APPROVED IS APPROVED AND WHAT IS DISAPPROVED IS DISAPPROVED; AND THAT IT CONCERNS THINGS THAT ARE YET TO OCCUR, BECAUSE THE COMMAND TO DO SOMETHING THAT IS PAST OR THE PROHIBITION FROM DOING IT IS NONSENSE; AND THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT SHOULD HAVE SOME EFFECT; AND THAT IT IS SAFE FROM HARM.

242. And *command* (al-amr) is seeking an act from another authoritatively, and *prohibition* (an-nahy) is seeking the forsaking (of an act) authoritatively. And *what is approved* is every good (ḥasan) act which is characterized by some quality in addition to its goodness. And *what is disapproved* is evil (al-qabîḥ). And since this is settled, there are here

two matters for discussion: (1) First, the doctors have agreed that the commanding (men) to do what is approved and the prohibiting them from doing what is disapproved are incumbent, but they then disagreed in several points: (*a*) First, is it incumbent by reason or by tradition? Shaykh Ṭûsî held the first (position), and Sayyidu'l-Murtaḍâ the second, and the author also held the second. And the Shaykh gave as his proof that this commanding and prohibiting were kindness (luṭf) in doing what is incumbent and forsaking what is evil, and hence they were incumbent by reason. We say in reply that what is incumbent by reason does not belong exclusively to the individual (but belongs to Allâh). (What is *wâjib* by reason belongs exclusively to Allâh, what is *wâjib* for man is all traditional.) Hence in this case it would be incumbent upon the Most High, and that is false. For if He did these things (command what is approved and prohibit what is disapproved), then every evil thing would have to be removed and every incumbent thing would have to be performed, since commanding is inciting (ḥaml) to a thing and prohibiting is hindering from it. But what occurs is the opposite of that. And if He did not do that (that is, if the evil in the world is due to His not having commanded and prohibited), then He would have failed to perform what is incumbent. But He is the Wise (Ḥakîm), and this objection needs examination (cannot be accepted).

243. (*b*) Second, are they incumbent upon the individuals themselves, or may another act as substitute? The Shaykh held the first and the Sayyid the second. The Shaykh gave as his proof that incumbence is universal without any specialization, according to the word of the Most High, "Ye are the best folk that hath been raised up unto mankind, ye enjoin the Just (al-ma'rûf) and ye forbid the Evil (al-munkar)" (3:106). And the Sayyid gave as proof the fact that what was desired (al-maqṣûd) was that what was incumbent should be performed and what was evil should be removed, and therefore he who performs it (commands to do good and forbids evil) suffices for another (who does not). And also because of the word of the Most High, "And that there may

be among you a people who invite to the Good, and enjoin the Just, and forbid the wrong" (3: 100).

244. (2) The second discussion is about the conditions of their being incumbent, four of which the author has here mentioned: (*a*) First, the knowledge on the part of him who commands and prohibits that what is approved is approved and what is disapproved is disapproved, since if it were not thus he would surely command what was not approved and prohibit what was not disapproved. (*b*) Second, that they be things which will occur in the future, for a command to do what is past, or a prohibition to abstain from it is nonsense, and nonsense is evil. (*c*) Third, that he who commands and prohibits consider it possible that his commanding and prohibiting have some effect, for when he is sure that it will be ineffective, or considers it improbable, it ceases to be incumbent. (*d*) Fourth, the safety from harm of him who commands and prohibits, affecting either himself or any other Muslim, resulting from his commanding and prohibiting. For if he thinks it probable that harm will result, it ceases to be incumbent. And commanding and prohibiting with the heart and the tongue and the hand are incumbent and it should not be done in a severe manner when a gentler is possible.

245. And this is what I set out to finish and to write, and what it was my lot to collect and arrange, in spite of the small demand (for such a book) and my being short-handed (as to funds), along with the occurrence of journeys and the disturbance of my thoughts. However, I have hope in the goodness of the Most High that He will make it profitable, and that He will make it pure before His face. Verily, He hears and He answers, and Allâh is the Best of those who Give Success and who Appoint! Praise be to Allâh the Lord of the Worlds, and the blessing of Allâh be upon Muḥammad and all of his descendants!

NOTES

Par. 10.

[a] The Mu'tazilites also "agreed that the principles of *ma'rifa* and thankfulness for blessings are *wâjib* before one hears (the Prophet)" (Shahrastânî, ed. by Cureton, "al-Milal wa'n-Niḥal," p. 29). But the Ash'arite position was that *ma'rifa* is known to be incumbent not by reason but by tradition only.

[b] We see here that the Shî'ites hold that the *uṣûl* are all known by reason, whereas the Ash'arite position is that they are known only by tradition.

Par. 16.

"And with regard to *taqlîd* (blind acceptance)—the learned differ. Some say that it does not suffice, and that the *muqallid* (blind accepter) is an unbeliever (kâfir). Ibn al-Arabi (d. 543) held this and as-Sanûsî, and the latter gave in his commentary on his *Kubrâ* a lengthy refutation of those who hold that *taqlîd* is sufficient" (Creed of al-Faḍâlî, Macdonald, "Development of Muslim Theology," etc., p. 316). The Mu'tazilites with their emphasis on reason rejected *taqlîd*, and the Shî'ites have followed them.

Par. 19.

[a] In the creed of al-Nasafî, "Belief and Islam are one" (Macdonald, "Development," p. 312). But the Shî'ites consider Islâm to be wider than faith. See par. 234.

Par. 38.

The Sunnites usually list the positive qualities as follows: Life, Knowledge, Power, Will, Hearing, Seeing, Speaking (creed of al-Ghazzâlî, Macdonald, "Development," p. 304). The Shî'ites agree with them as to the first four qualities, though they place Power first. But in place of Hearing and Seeing they put Perceiving. They retain Speaking, but add two more to the list, namely, Being Eternal and Veracity.

Par. 47.

[a] an-Naẓẓâm was a prominent Mu'tazilite. See Macdonald, "Development," p. 140.

Par. 50.

By denying that Allâh does everything that He has Power to do the Shî'ites try to guard Him from evil without limiting His Power.

Par. 58.

[a] The Ṣifâtians held that the divine qualities were eternally inherent in the essence of Allâh. The Mu'tazilites rejected this doctrine, because "if the qualities share in priority they would share in godhood also," and the multiplicity of eternal existences would have to result, and this they denied. They said that the qualities were not in addition to the essence, but were the essence itself. Thus Allâh is Knowing by His essence, not by His Knowledge, and is Powerful by His essence, not by His Power. (Shahrastânî, p. 29; Macdonald, "Development," p. 136; Sell, "The Faith of Islam," third edition, pp. 194, 195.)

The Ash'arites held that the qualities were inherent in the essence, and were in addition to the essence. "He has qualities from all eternity existing in His essence." But they guarded themselves against the objection of the Mu'tazilites by adding, "They are not He nor are they any other than He" (creed of an-Nasafî, Macdonald, "Development," p. 309).

The Shî'ites adopted the Mu'tazilite doctrine in full. They teach that the qualities are the essence itself, and that Allâh is Powerful by His essence, Knowing by His essence, etc.

Par. 62.

[a] See Macdonald, "Development," p. 170, etc.

Par. 63.

[a] The doctrine of Will's being a form of Knowledge is also due to Mu'tazilite influence. Abû Hudhayl (d. c. 226 A.H.) "endeavoured—and in this he was followed by most of the Mu'tazilites—to cut down the number of Allâh's attributes. His Will, he said, was a form of His Knowledge; He knew that there was good in an action, and that know ledge was His will" (Macdonald, "Development," p. 137).

Par. 67.

[a] This quality of Perception is given in place of the two qualities of Hearing and Sight which are always included in the orthodox list. The Shî'ites inherited from the Mu'tazilites a dislike to all expressions which seemed to suggest anthropomorphism, and they here resolve Hearing and Sight into the Knowledge of things heard and seen.

Par. 76.

[a] The orthodox belief is thus stated in the creed of al-Ghazzâlî (Macdonald, "Development," pp. 303-304): "And we witness that He speaks, commanding, forbidding, praising, threatening, with a speech from all eternity, prior, subsisting in His essence, not resembling the speech of created things. It is not a sound which originates through the slipping out of air, or striking of bodies; nor is it a letter which is separated off by the closing down a lip or moving a tongue . . . And the Qur'ân is repeated by tongues, written in copies, preserved in hearts: yet it, in spite of that, is prior, subsisting in the essence of Allâh, not subject to division and separation through being transferred to hearts and leaves. And Mûsâ heard the speech of Allâh without a

sound and without a letter, just as the pious see the essence of Allâh in the other world, without a substance or an attribute."

Par. 79.

[a] al-Ash'arî had said, "We teach that the Qur'ân is Allâh's Word, and that it is uncreated, and that whoever says it is created is an unbeliever (kâfir)" (Macdonald, "Development," p. 295). The Shî'ite reply is that the calling of anything prior except the divine essence is *kufr!*

Par. 81.

Veracity is not given as one of the divine qualities in any of the Sunnite creeds, nor have I found any mention of it by the Mu'tazilites. But its admission by the Shî'ites to the list of the positive qualities is no doubt due to their emphasis upon Justice in Allâh's character.

Par. 90.

"The Mu'tazilites have agreed in rejecting comparison (tashbîh) of Him of every sort, as to direction or locus or form or body or limitation or motion or decrease or change or impression, and they have made it incumbent to explain (ta'wîl) the figurative (mutashâbih) verses" (Shahrastânî, p. 29). This was a protest against the anthropomorphism of the Ḥanbalites and Karrâmites who took literally the statements of the Koran about Allâh's hands, face, His sitting on His throne, etc. The Ash'arites also rejected this anthropomorphism, but they felt it was impious to pry into the nature of Allâh and try to explain what was meant by His hands and His throne. Hence they simply affirmed that "Allâh has settled Himself upon His throne," that He "has a countenance—and two hands—and two eyes, *without asking how* (bilâ kayfa)" (creed of al-Ash'arî, Macdonald, "Development," pp. 294, 190). The Shî'ites follow the Mu'tazilites in holding that the anthropomorphisms must be explained (ta'wîl).

Par. 99.

[a] See note on par. 58.

Par. 101.

[a] "They have agreed in denying the vision of Allâh the Most High with the eyes in the future life" (Shahrastânî, p. 29). The Shî'ites agree wholly with the Mu'tazilites in this matter.

[b] al-Ash'arî said, "We believe that Allâh at the Day of Resurrection will be visible to the eyes, as the moon is seen upon the night of the full moon; the believers will see Him . . . We teach that Moses besought Allâh that he might see Him in this world; then Allâh revealed Himself to the mountain and turned it into dust and taught Moses thereby that he could not see Him in this world (Qur. 7, 139)" (Macdonald, "Development," p. 295).

And according to the creed of an-Nasafî, "That there is a Vision (ru'ya) of Allâh the Most High is allowed by reason and certified by tradition (naql). A proof on authority has come down with the affirma-

tion that believers have a Vision of Allâh the Most High in Paradise and that He is seen, not in a place or in a direction or by facing or the joining of glances or the placing of a distance between him who sees and Allâh the Most High " (Macdonald, " Development," p. 310).

Par. 102.

[a] This is in reply to the Ash'arites who said that the vision of Allâh was denied Moses only in *this* world.

Par. 106.

See Macdonald, " Development," p. 160.

Par. 107.

[a] See note on par. 58.

Par. 111.

The Sunnite theologians do not make Justice one of the Principles (uṣûl) of religion. The Shî'ites owe their emphasis upon Justice to their connection with the Mu'tazilites, who called themselves " the people of Unity and Justice " (Shahrastânî, p. 29; Macdonald, " Development," p. 136).

Par. 115.

[a] According to Shahrastânî (p. 30) the Mu'tazilites hold that " The cognition of good and evil is also within the province of reason; nothing is known to be right or wrong until reason has enlightened us as to the distinction " (Sell, " The Faith of Islam," p. 197).

[b] Note that only an *injurious* lie is considered evil. Shî'ites hold that in some circumstances lying is not only justifiable but is positively incumbent.

Par. 119.

[a] See Macdonald, " Development," p. 192. In the creed of al-Ash'arî (Macdonald, p. 294) we read: " There is no Creator but Allâh. The works of creatures are created and predestined by Allâh, as He said (Qur. 37, 94), ' And Allâh has created you and what ye do.' Man is able to create nothing."

So also the creed of an-Nasafî (Macdonald, p. 310): " And Allâh the Most High is the Creator of all actions of His creatures, whether of unbelief or belief, of obedience or rebellion; all of them are by the will of Allâh and His sentence and His conclusion and His decreeing. And to His creatures belong actions of choice, for which they are rewarded or punished, and the good in these is by the good pleasure of Allâh (riḍâ) and the vile in them is not by His good pleasure."

[b] The Mu'tazilites insisted upon man's freedom, and denied *kasb*. " They are united that the creature has power over and creates his actions both good and evil."

[c] The Zaydites were a Shî'ite sect who derived their name from Zayd, a grandson of Ḥusayn (see Macdonald, " Development," p. 36 etc.).

Par. 120.

The Ash'arites replied to this objection that Allāh gave man the ability to perform the action: "And the ability to do the action (istiṭā'a) goes along with the action and is the essence of the power (qudra) by which the action takes place, and this word 'ability' means the soundness of the causes and instruments and limbs" (Macdonald, p. 310)

Par. 126.

[a] "We witness that He is a Willer of the things that are, a Director of the things that happen; there does not come about in the world, seen or unseen, little or much, small or great, good or evil, advantage or disadvantage, faith or unbelief, knowledge or ignorance, success or loss, increase or diminution, obedience or rebellion, except by His will. What He wills is, and what He wills not is not. Not a glance of one who looks, or a slip of one who thinks is outside of His will: He is the Creator, the Bringer back, the Doer of that which He wills." (Creed of al-Ghazzālī, Macdonald, "Development," p. 302.)

[b] Shahrastānī says that the Mu'tazilites taught that "the Lord is far removed from having evil and injustice and unbelief and disobedience attributed to Him, because if He had created injustice He would be unjust" (p. 30).

Par. 130.

The Ash'arites held that "it is not incumbent upon Allāh the Most High to do that which may be best for the creature" (creed of an-Nasafī, Macdonald, p. 300). "There is nothing incumbent upon Allāh, against the doctrine of the Mu'tazilites, who say that it is incumbent upon Allāh to do that which is best (ṣalāḥ) for the creature." (See the creed of al-Faḍālī where the Ash'arite answer to the Mu'tazilite position is given—Macdonald, p. 343.)

The Mu'tazilites insisted that Allāh could do nothing which was not for the good of the creature. "And they have agreed that the Wise (al-Ḥakīm) does nothing except what is advantageous (ṣalāḥ) and good (khayr), and because of His wisdom it is necessary for Him to consider the advantage of the creatures. But they differed as to what is most advantageous" (Shahrastānī, p. 29). See Macdonald, "Development," p. 136.

Par. 131.

So far as I could discover, *taklīf* is mentioned only once in the Sunnite creeds translated by Dr. Macdonald and published in his "Development." The emphasis placed upon it in the Shī'ite creeds is due to the Shī'ite doctrine that Allāh must do what is best for man, and therefore must give man a reward in the future life. But Allāh is Just, and cannot reward one who has no desert. Hence He must give man the opportunity to earn reward. Hence He must impose tasks for man to perform, that reward may be merited. But Allāh will do more for man than merely give him a recompense for his labours, for the merited advantage will be joined with exaltation (see par. 142).

Par. 137.

[a] Note that the Shî'ites hold that the *uṣûl* must be known by reason. The orthodox belief is that the *uṣûl* must be known by tradition, and that reason has to do only with the *furû'* (Sell, "The Faith of Islam," p. 190).

Par. 139.

[a] It is the belief of both Shî'ites and Sunnites that man was created with a desire for evil as well as for good. This desire has its seat in the *nafs-i-ammâra*, which must therefore be constantly kept under by *'aql*, the seat of all good desires.

Par. 143.

[a] The Mu'tazilites also distinguished between reward, recompense, and grace. "Recompense ('iwaḍ) and grace (tafaḍḍul) have another meaning from reward (thawâb)" (Shahrastânî, p. 30).

Par. 144.

Luṭf is anything that Allâh does, either directly or indirectly, to make it easier for man to obey and harder for him to disobey. Shahrastânî says that the Mu'tazilites differed among themselves as to whether *luṭf* was *wâjib* for Allâh or not. None of the Sunnite creeds translated by Dr. Macdonald in the "Development" mention *luṭf*, and the Sunnites did not need the doctrine, for since they held that all of man's actions were created by Allâh there was no fear that His will would not be done. But the Shî'ites and Mu'tazilites, since they insisted upon man's freedom, had in some way to make sure that Allâh would attain His purpose in human affairs. And so they set forth the doctrine of *luṭf*, by which Allâh influenced men to do His will, but did not force them.

Par. 151.

[a] See note on par. 143[a].

Par. 154.

[a] See note on par. 130.

Par. 160.

[a] When Musaylima, the false prophet of Arabia, tried to reproduce some of the miracles of Muḥammad the result was just the opposite of what he desired. The application of his saliva made sore eyes blind, and wounded limbs leprous, and fresh water brackish! See "The Hyât-ul-Kuloob" (Herrick), p. 309.

Par. 164.

In the Sunnite creeds of an-Nasafî (d. 537 A.H.) and al-Ghazzâlî (d. 505 A.H.) and al-Ash'arî (d. c. 320 A.H.) there is no mention of *'iṣma* as a quality necessary for a prophet. However, in the late creed of al-Faḍâlî (13th century A.H.) we read that one of the necessary things for messengers is "their being preserved ('iṣma) from falling into

things forbidden (muḥarram) and disliked (makrûh)" (Macdonald, p. 347), and this is now the orthodox belief. See Sell, "The Faith of Islam," p. 244.

Par. 166.

* Refer to Sell, p. 244, note 2.

Par. 171.

* Refer to Nicholson, "A Literary History of the Arabs," p. 343.

Par. 174.

* Contrast with the Shî'ite conception of the Imâm that of the Sunnites, as expressed in the creed of an-Nasafî (Macdonald, pp. 313-314): "The Muslims cannot do without a leader (Imâm) who shall occupy himself with the enforcing of their decisions, and in maintaining their restrictive ordinances and guarding their frontiers, and equipping their armies, and receiving their alms, and putting down robberies and thieving and highwaymen, and maintaining the Friday services and the Festivals, and removing quarrels that fall between creatures, and receiving evidence bearing on legal claims, and marrying minors, male and female, who have no guardians, and dividing booty. And it is necessary that the leader should be visible, not hidden and expected to appear (muntaẓar), and that he should be of the tribe of Quraysh and not of any other. And he is not assigned exclusively to the sons of Hashim nor to the children of Ali. And it is not a condition that he should be protected by Allâh from sin ('iṣma), nor that he should be the most excellent of the people of his time, but it is a condition that he should be *sui juris* [*i.e.*, Muslim, free, male, sane, adult], should be a good governor and should be able to carry out decrees and to guard the restrictive ordinances (ḥadds) of Islam and to protect the wronged against him who wronged him. And he is not to be deposed from the leadership on account of immorality or tyranny."

The Sunnites want an earthly ruler with sufficient power to govern the Muslim state and repulse all enemies, while the Shî'ites look for one who can establish the Kingdom of Heaven on earth and bring an end to all the evils of the world. When one recalls the historical situation at the time when the Shî'ite creed was written it does not seem strange that after the horrors of the Mongol invasion and the wars and confusion which followed, some men should long for a sinless Imâm who was able to "restrain the oppressor from his oppression and avenge the oppressed of his oppressor."

Par. 184.

* For Sunnites the Foundations of religion are the Koran, the Sunna, Ijmâ', and Qiyâs. It is evident from the text that the Shî'ites reject all of these as insufficient in themselves, and look to a divinely guided Imâm, who alone can interpret the Koran and make known to men their duty. The Shî'ite *mujtahids* are the representatives of the hidden

Imâm, but it is possible for them to err, as they do not receive any supernatural guidance from the Imâm. There is no place in Shî'ite theology for *kashf* (see Macdonald, "Development," p. 215, etc.).

Par. 193.

[a] In the creed of an-Nasafî we read: "And the most excellent of mankind after our Prophet is Abû Bakr the Veracious."

[b] A full account of the incident here referred to is found in chapter 18 of Herrick's "Hyât-ul-Kuloob" (which is a translation of volume ii of the great work of Mullâ Muḥammad Bâqir-i-Majlisî (d. 1070/1659) —see Browne's "Persian Literature in Modern Times," pp. 409, 417). The story in brief is as follows: When Muḥammad sent letters to the kings of Rûm, Persia, etc., summoning them to embrace Islâm, the Christians of Najrân in South Arabia assembled in their church to decide what they ought to do. After various proposals had been made as to whether they should fight or yield or become Muslims, someone arose and quoted Jesus' words to Simon Peter promising to send Aḥmad the Pârqaliṭ (the parakletos, the Comforter), whose son should conquer the world. But it was replied that Muḥammad had no offspring, and so this could not refer to him. Then they brought out the Book of *Jâmi'* and read from the story of Âdam, how Âdam once saw a brilliant light with four other lights about it, and was told by Allâh that these lights were five of his descendants, namely, Muḥammad and his Wazîr and his daughter and his two grandsons who would succeed him. Ibrâhim also saw a similar vision, and the same thing was predicted by Mûsâ and 'Îsâ.

So it was decided to send all their princes and doctors to Medina to see whether Muḥammad was the one whom 'Îsâ had predicted. Accordingly they entered Medina in great pomp, found Muḥammad in the Mosque, and debated the question of the person of Christ with him. At last, unable to convince one another, they proposed to him that they refer the matter to Allâh, and call down His curse on whoever lied. Then the verse of *Mubâhala* (mutual cursing) was sent down (Koran 3: 53, 54), Muḥammad agreed, and the contest was set for the following day. The Christians said to one another, "If Muḥammad comes out with royal pomp, then we shall conquer, for he is only an earthly ruler; but if he comes out with only a few godly people then he is a prophet, and will prevail."

The next day the Christian leaders came forward with their sons and wives. All the people of Medina came out with banners waving to witness the conflict. Late in the morning Muḥammad came forth with the Holy Family only ('Alî, Fâṭima, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn), and took his place with them under a cloak hung between two small trees. The Christians asked why he brought out those people and not the chief men of his religion. He replied that Allâh had so commanded. Then the Christians, remembering what they had read in the *Jâmi'*, turned pale and retired, fearing to make the trial, for they recognized Muḥammad as the Prophet whom 'Îsâ had predicted. Muḥammad raised his

hands to pray, and at once the mountains began to tremble and smoke covered the earth. If he had spoken but one word everything would have been destroyed! So the Christians made peace, and agreed to pay an annual tribute of 2,000 robes and 1,000 misqâls of gold.

The Shî'ites attach very great importance to this incident, not only as proving the prophetic mission of Muḥammad, but also because it establishes their doctrine of the Imâmate. See "Hyât-ul-Kuloob," pp. 325, 326.

Par. 204.

For a fuller account of this incident see "Hyât-ul-Kuloob," ch. 19.

Par. 205.

This idea was possibly derived from Ibn Sabâ, the founder of the Saba'ites, a Jew who carried on a vigorous campaign for 'Alî. See Nicholson, "A Literary History of the Arabs," p. 215.

Par. 207.

a "Aided by divine power, Aly seized the outer ring of the gate, and shook it so violently that the whole fortress trembled. The gate broke away, and Aly, using it as a shield, rushed into the town, which he soon overcame. He then hurled the gate forty cubits distance, which seventy men, to satisfy their curiosity, tried in vain to lift" ("Hyât-ul-Kuloob," p. 274).

Par. 226.

The Khârijites divided sins into great (kabîra) and small (ṣaghîra), and taught that a believer who committed a great sin and did not repent of it became an unbeliever, and if he died without repenting he would remain eternally in the Fire (see Macdonald, "Development," p. 126).

The Mu'tazilites said that such a sinner ceased to be a believer, but did not become an unbeliever (kâfir), and must remain forever in the Fire, but his sufferings would be mitigated (see Shahrastânî, p. 29).

The Ash'arites said: "We are of the opinion that we may not accuse anyone of unbelief (kufr), who prays towards Mecca, on account of sin committed by him, such as unchastity, theft, wine-drinking, as the Khârijites believe, who judge that these thereby become unbelievers. We teach that whoever commits a great sin (kabîra), or anything like it, holding it to be allowed, is an unbeliever, since he does not believe in its prohibition" (Macdonald, p. 296). Thus only one who holds that such sins are *lawful* becomes an unbeliever by committing them.

With this agrees the creed of an-Nasafî (Macdonald, p. 311): "A great sin (kabîra) does not exclude the creature who believes from the Belief (îmân) and does not make him an unbeliever. And Allâh does not forgive him who joins another with Himself, but He forgives anything beneath that to whom He wills of sins small (ṣaghîra) or great. And there may be punishment for a small and pardon for a great one, if it be not of the nature of considering lawful what is forbidden, for that is

unbelief (kufr)." And according to the creed of al-Ghazzâlî (Macdonald, p. 307), ". . . the attestors of Allâh's Unity (muwaḥḥids) will be brought forth from the fire after vengeance has been taken on them, so that there will not remain in Hell an attestor of Allâh's Unity." Thus the orthodox belief came to be that after a period of punishment in Hell all believers would be admitted to the Garden.

The Shî'ites take the same position. They hold that a believer does not become an unbeliever by committing a great sin. If the sin was against Allâh, he will be forgiven whenever he repents. If, however, the sin was against man, he must first make it right, and then he will be forgiven. If he dies without repenting he will go to Hell for a time, and then be transported to the Garden where he will remain for ever. If he has the intercession of the Prophet and the Imâms or the forgiveness of Allâh, the Fire will not burn him, otherwise he must be tormented to the extent that his sin deserves, and then be carried to the Garden.

The Sunnites also hope for the intercession of Muḥammad—"And the intercession of the Messengers and of the excellent on behalf of those who commit great sins is established" (creed of an-Nasafî, Macdonald, p. 311). "We teach that Allâh will release a few out of Hell on account of Muḥammad's intercession, after they have been scorched there" (creed of al-Ash'arî, Macdonald, p. 296).

Par. 234.

[a] The Mu'tazilites considered good works essential to faith (Sell, "The Faith of Islam," p. 185). But Shî'ites and Sunnites agree in holding that "faith (îmân) is assent (taṣdîq) to that which comes from Allâh and confession (iqrâr) of it" (creed of an-Nasafî, Macdonald, p. 312), and works are separate from it.

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